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Abstract
Global greenhouse gas emissions need to be substantially reduced to avoid
dangerous climate change. As emission reductions in one country also
benefit all other countries, international cooperation is needed for effective
emission mitigation. It is not immediately clear if stable global climate co-
operation is achievable, as each country has the right to reject an agreement.
Game theory is a commonly used tool for a formal analysis of this situation.
The concept of core stability nicely reproduces the requirement of consensus
for decisions in the international climate negotiations and has been applied
in some theoretical and numerical analyses in the literature. However, these
analyses miss several important real-world properties.
This thesis introduces five such properties into the model of international
climate cooperation based on core stability: international economic effects,
different pathways of future technological development, the influence of
technological uncertainty on decision making, the influence of uncertainty
about climate damages on decision making, and cooperation in non-global
groups. To study the impact of the first two properties, a numerical model
of emission levels and utility of each country for each possible coalition
of countries is constructed. The influence of uncertainty is examined with
a theoretical model, applying several concepts from the game-theoretical
literature. Finally, a theoretical analysis is performed to determine the
stability of cooperation in non-global groups, with a numerical application
i
to the Group of Twenty.
Abstract
The analyses show that the introduction of real-world properties into the
core stability model substantially changes the results, compared to the
original model. Global climate cooperation is found to be unstable in
certain scenarios after the introduction of international economic effects,
mainly caused by fossil-fuel market effects. Further, uncertainty about the
future development of low-carbon technologies and of climate damages can
present an obstacle to stable global cooperation, if risk preferences between
countries vary substantially. Non-global groups also do not necessarily of-
fer a way to stable cooperation, as outsiders exploit cooperation in the group.
This thesis is based on four papers prepared at the Fraunhofer Institute for
Systems and Innovation Research (ISI) in Karlsruhe under the supervision
of Professor K.-M. Ehrhart at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
and is written in English.
ii
Kurzfassung
Der globale Ausstoß von Treibhausgasen muss substanziell reduziert wer-
den, um schädlichen Klimawandel zu verhindern. Effektive Emissionsmin-
derung benötigt internationale Kooperation, da sich Emissionsreduktionen
eines Landes global auswirken. Die Erreichbarkeit stabiler globaler Kli-
makooperation ist ungewiss, da ein Abkommen durch jedes Land abgelehnt
werden kann.
Die Anwendung von Spieltheorie erlaubt eine formale Analyse dieser Situa-
tion. Das Konzept der Kernstabilität reproduziert zentrale Eigenschaften der
internationalen Klimaverhandlungen und wurde bereits in einigen theoretis-
chen und numerischen Analysen verwendet. Dabei wurden allerdings einige
wichtige Eigenschaften der realen Klimaverhandlungen nicht berücksichtigt.
Diese Dissertation integriert fünf dieser Eigenschaften in das Modell
der internationalen Klimaverhandlungen basierend auf Kernstabilität:
internationale ökonomische Effekte, unterschiedliche Pfade der zukün-
ftigen technologischen Entwicklung, den Einfluss von technologischer
Unsicherheit auf Entscheidungen, den Einfluss von Unsicherheit über
den Klimawandel auf Entscheidungen und Kooperation in nicht-globalen
Gruppen. Für die Analyse der ersten beiden Eigenschaften wird ein
numerisches Modell von Emissionen und Nutzen jedes Landes für jede
mögliche Koalition von Ländern erstellt. Der Einfluss von Unsicherheit wird
mit einem theoretischen Modell untersucht, welches mehrere Konzepte der
spieltheoretischen Literatur anwendet. Schließlich wird eine theoretische
iii
Kurzfassung
Analyse der Stabilität von Kooperation in nicht-globalen Gruppen durchge-
führt, welche am Beispiel der Gruppe der zwanzig wichtigsten Industrie-
und Schwellenländer (G20) quantifiziert wird.
Die Analysen zeigen, dass die Integration von weiteren Eigenschaften der
realen Klimaverhandlungen in das Modell der Kernstabilität substanziellen
Einfluss auf die Ergebnisse hat. Globale Klimakooperation ist nicht stabil in
bestimmten Szenarien unter Berücksichtigung internationaler ökonomischer
Effekte. Unsicherheit über die zukünftige Entwicklung von klimafre-
undlichen Technologien und des Klimawandels kann ebenfalls ein Hindernis
für stabile globale Kooperation darstellen, falls sich die Risikopräferenzen
verschiedener Länder substanziell unterscheiden. Weiterhin bieten nicht-
globale Gruppen nicht zwangsläufig einen Weg zu stabiler Kooperation, da
Kooperation in der Gruppe durch Außenstehende ausgenutzt wird.
Diese Dissertation basiert auf vier Papieren, welche am Fraunhofer-Institut
für System- und Innovationsforschung (ISI) in Karlsruhe unter der Betreuung
von Professor K.-M. Ehrhart am Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
erstellt wurden. Sie ist in englischer Sprache verfasst.
iv
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1 Introduction
The Earth’s surface temperature has increased by almost 1°C above the pre-
industrial level, due to the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs), mainly
carbon dioxide (CO2) (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
2013). If global GHG emissions continue to rise according to the histori-
cal precedent, surface temperature will increase by a further 2°C to 4°C by
2100. This climate change poses risks in several areas, including coastal
protection, food security and human health (IPCC, 2014a). Even if the tem-
perature increase is held to 2°C above the pre-industrial level, global eco-
nomic losses from climate change will amount to 0.2%-2.0% of income,
with losses “more likely than not to be greater, rather than smaller, than this
range” (IPCC, 2014a).
In order to prevent the worst impacts of climate change, global GHG emis-
sions need to be reduced. However, this is complicated by the fact that GHG
emission reductions in one country are a public good, as other countries can-
not be excluded from receiving the benefit of emission reductions (in the
form of reduced climate change impacts). Consequently, the amount of emis-
sion reductions is less than the globally optimal level, because each country
only accounts for the benefits occurring in its sovereign territory. This sit-
uation is sometimes referred to as the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin,
1968). To solve this tragedy, countries can enter into international agree-
ments, or treaties. As countries cannot be forced into an agreement, it has to
be in the self-interest of all countries to participate in the agreement. Such
an agreement is called stable.
1
1 Introduction
All countries would prefer if other countries reduced their emissions, while
not having to reduce emissions themselves. On the other hand, global coop-
eration leads to an optimal amount of emission reductions on a global level
and therefore creates a net benefit, which can be distributed among coun-
tries. Consequently, it is not immediately clear whether a stable agreement
is achievable. So far, international negotiations have had limited success at
restricting global GHG emissions.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 International climate negotiations
For the particular problem of climate change, negotiations about an agree-
ment on GHG emission reductions are held under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC was
adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. Its
objective is “to achieve [. . . ] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system” (United Nations, 1992). Membership
in the UNFCCC is almost universal, as 197 countries have ratified the
Convention (UNFCCC, 2016c). To achieve its goal, the UNFCCC hosts
annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs), at which countries negotiate
and adopt climate agreements.
The first agreement adopted under the UNFCCC is the Kyoto Protocol (KP),
which was negotiated at COP3 in 1997 (UNFCCC, 1998). It includes bind-
ing GHG emission targets for developed countries (so-called Annex I coun-
tries), but no such targets for developing countries. While the KP was ini-
tially signed by all major emitters, the United States (US) never ratified it
and new president George W. Bush announced in 2001 that he opposed the
KP, because large developing countries like China and India did not have
to reduce their emissions under the KP (Dessai, 2001). The KP still en-
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tered into force without the US in 2005. However, the emission targets in
the KP, running from 2008 to 2012, turned out to be rather unambitious,
due to the global economic crisis of 2007, the issue of “hot air” emission
reductions1 in economies in transition (Morel and Shishlov, 2014) and the
absence of the US.
The negotiation process for further emission reductions after the end of the
KP period in 2012 was started in 2007, at COP13 on Bali. Under the Bali Ac-
tion Plan (UNFCCC, 2007), a long-term solution was to be agreed at COP15
in 2009. However, COP15 in Copenhagen failed to reach a global agreement,
despite the presence of over 100 heads of state and government. Instead, sev-
eral countries made non-binding emission reduction pledges in the Copen-
hagen Accord (CA) (UNFCCC, 2009).
After the failure of Copenhagen, a new negotiation process was started at
COP17 in Durban. This process aimed to develop an agreement “applica-
ble to all Parties” by COP21, which was held in Paris in 2015 (UNFCCC,
2011). In the run-up to the Paris conference, countries were requested to
submit “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDCs), outlining
their national climate strategy. To date, submitted INDCs cover 190 coun-
tries2 (UNFCCC, 2016a). At COP21, the Paris Agreement (PA) was adopted
(UNFCCC, 2015a), under which the formal process of submission of “na-
tionally determined contributions” (NDCs) will be repeated every five years.
However, the PA does not include binding emission reduction targets beyond
each country’s NDC. The PA also includes a target to hold the temperature
increase to “well below 2°C” and intends to “pursu[e] efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5°C” (UNFCCC, 2015a, Art. 2). Mitigation efforts
outlined in the currently submitted INDCs are not in line with least-cost 2°C
scenarios (UNFCCC, 2016b, Figure 2).
1 “Hot Air” refers to emission targets set above the business-as-usual emission level. This cre-
ated a surplus of emission credits in some countries.
2 The European Union submitted a joint INDC for all its member states.
3
1 Introduction
The rules of decision making under the UNFCCC are not clearly defined,
as countries failed to agree on rules of procedure prior to the first COP.
Since then, the UNFCCC operates under draft rules of procedure (UNFCCC,
1996). As these draft rules include varying proposals for voting rules, all de-
cisions have to be made by “consensus”. In practice, consensus has usually
been interpreted as the absence of a stated objection, i.e. a unanimity re-
quirement (Vihma, 2015). Some recent COP decisions have however been
adopted despite opposition by a few countries, sparking protests and delays
at subsequent meetings (King, 07/06/2013; Vihma, 2015).
1.1.2 Modeling of international climate cooperation
The question of whether international cooperation on climate change among
rational countries is actually possible has attracted much attention in the eco-
nomic literature since the inception of the UNFCCC.
Game theory is a commonly used tool for a formal analysis of this situation.
Each country is represented by a player in a game of international negotiation
over emission levels. Players can cooperate with each other in a coalition,
meaning that the wishes of all coalition members are taken into account when
choosing emission levels. The analysis then centers on whether a coalition
is stable, which is the case if no player has an incentive to change their
behaviour. A particular case is the grand coalition of all players, whose
stability is also described as the stability of global cooperation.
The analysis of the stability of a coalition requires assumptions about the be-
haviour and the decision making of players. Consequently, different stability
concepts exist in the literature, which lead to vastly contrasting results3. The
core stability concept replicates the requirement of consensus in the UN-
FCCC negotiations and focuses on the distribution of the benefit created
by global cooperation. It predicts stable global cooperation (Chander and
3 A more detailed discussion of the different models, stability concepts and the relevant literature
is provided in Chapter 2.
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Tulkens, 1995, 1997; Helm, 2001). Internal and external stability consid-
ers the incentives of individual countries to join or exit different coalitions.
Under this concept, only coalitions with very few members can be stable
(Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis,
2006). Farsighted stability builds on internal and external stability by al-
lowing individual countries to consider a sequence of coalition membership
changes, instead of only one change. Global cooperation under this concept
can be stable or unstable, depending on the specific model setup (Ray and
Vohra, 2001; de Zeeuw, 2008).
Most of the literature on international climate cooperation is based on inter-
nal and external stability, while some studies also apply farsighted stability.
Core stability, on the other hand, has only been utilized in very few stud-
ies beyond the initial analysis by Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) and its
numerical applications.
1.2 Objective
The lack of development of core stability is surprising, given that the con-
cept highlights two important features of the international climate negotia-
tions, which are either ignored or reduced to minor points of interest in the
other two stability concepts. First, core stability is based on a global una-
nimity requirement for stable climate agreements, in line with the consensus
rule of the UNFCCC negotiations. Second, core stability focuses on the
distribution of emission reduction cost and benefit between countries in a
global agreement, a major point of friction in the international negotiations.
Therefore, core stability nicely complements the focus on individual coun-
try incentives of the other two stability concepts. Further, an analysis of a
particular issue with different concepts allows one to distill robust effects
from model-specific effects, making core stability analyses also relevant for
scholars preferring another stability concept.
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The main objective of this thesis is the advancement of the theoretical model
of international climate cooperation using core stability. In its original form,
the model is characterized by a high level of abstraction. Countries’ incen-
tives are described by simple functions, which miss several key factors influ-
encing the international climate negotiations. However, so far no attempt has
been made to include important real-world properties into the core stability
model. A reason for this lack of development might be the high complexity
of the model, both theoretically and numerically, due to the large number of
possible coalitions. Nevertheless, several real-world properties could reason-
ably influence the stability of global climate cooperation, so their inclusion
in the model might provide additional insight.
In this thesis, I extend the core stability analysis by introducing five real-
world properties into the model of climate cooperation. For each property, it
is determined whether the result of stable global cooperation from the orig-
inal model still holds up. Further, it is checked whether key parameters, in
particular the extent of mitigation cost and damage cost, influence stabil-
ity of cooperation.
First, I include international economic effects, such as technological
spillovers and changes in fossil fuel prices. This is realised via a gener-
alization of the cost of emission reductions, which is assumed to depend
purely on domestic emissions in the original model and therefore misses
international effects.
Second, I investigate the impact of different pathways of future technolog-
ical development. In the original model, the cost of mitigation measures
is fixed, masking large uncertainties in the future development of key low-
carbon technologies.
Third, I integrate uncertainty about future technology development in the
decision making process of countries. Depending on the risk preference,
this inclusion can lead to higher or lower emission levels and influence the
stability of cooperation. However, the original model only allows for deci-
sions under certainty.
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Fourth, I also include uncertainties about the extent of future damages
from climate change. Similar to technological uncertainty, the original
model does not allow countries to incorporate this lack of knowledge in
their decision making.
Fifth, I modify the original model to study the stability of cooperation in non-
global groups. The slow progress of negotiations under the UNFCCC has
inspired the idea of negotiations in other fora, so-called climate clubs. Fre-
quently mentioned as potential climate clubs are the Group of Twenty (G20)
and the Major Economies Forum On Energy And Climate (MEF) (Hjerpe
and Nasiritousi, 2015). The decision making in such groups is similar to the
UNFCCC, as decisions are made by consensus of all members. Therefore,
the core stability concept is a natural candidate for the analysis of stability of
climate cooperation in such clubs. However, the model of core stability has
so far only been used to study global cooperation.
1.3 Approach
Chapter 2 starts by giving an overview of the original model of core stability
and of other stability concepts. The chapter further discusses the literature
for all concepts and compares assumptions and results.
For the inclusion of international economic effects in Chapter 3, the con-
sumption function in the original model of core stability is extended to in-
corporate consequences of emission mitigation in multiple countries. To as-
sess the effects on stability of global cooperation, a numerical model of the
extended setup is implemented, which allows for the calculation of the emis-
sion level and utility of each country for each possible coalition of countries.
The model is applied using consumption functions from a computable gen-
eral equilibrium (CGE) model and damage functions from the literature. The
calculation is performed for three scenarios, depicting a range of possible
damages from climate change. The chapter also discusses policy implica-
tions of the results.
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In Chapter 4, the numerical model is used to determine the influence of future
pathways for key low-carbon technologies, namely wind energy, solar pho-
tovoltaic, and carbon capture and storage. To this end, the model is applied
to two additional sets of consumption functions from the CGE model, repre-
senting an optimistic and a pessimistic outlook on the development of these
technologies. In addition, the incentives of key countries are analysed using
detailed economic outputs from the CGE model. The additional consump-
tion functions are again combined with three scenarios for climate damages,
resulting in a total of nine specifications.
Chapter 5 considers the effect of uncertainty on the decision making of coun-
tries, and the subsequent impact on the stability of climate cooperation. The
analysis in this chapter is based on the original theoretical setup without in-
ternational economic effects, so as to avoid overlapping effects. The setup
is extended, using concepts from the game-theoretical literature, to include
uncertain utility and payoffs, as well as individual risk preferences for each
country. This basic model is applied to both technological uncertainty and
uncertainty in climate damages, as well as to two different concepts of an un-
certain allocation present in the game-theoretical literature. For each specifi-
cation, either an example of a game in which global cooperation is unstable is
presented, or it is shown that global cooperation is stable for all parameters.
Finally, in Chapter 6 the original model of global cooperation is adapted
to study the stability of cooperation in climate clubs. First, it is assumed
that countries in a club are symmetric and the influence of key parameters on
stability is analysed. Afterwards, the assumption of symmetry is dropped and
the impact of heterogeneity is studied. Further, mitigation cost and climate
damage parameters are estimated for the case of the G20, allowing for an
assessment of its potential as a climate club.
Each chapter also provides a short literature overview on the corresponding
topic and compares the results with relevant analyses from other stability
concepts. The thesis concludes in Chapter 7, which also provides overar-
ching conclusions and implications drawn from the results of the analyses,
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as well as a critical reflection of the applied methods and an outlook for
further research.
Chapters 3 to 6 are based on four papers, which have been slightly edited for
consistency and coherence in this thesis. Table 1.1 shows the authors, title
and reference for each paper.
Chap-
ter
Authors Title
Refe-
rence
3
Jan Kersting,
Vicki Duscha,
Matthias Weitzel
Cooperation on climate
change under economic
linkages - How the
inclusion of macro-
economic effects affects
stability of a global
climate coalition
Kersting
et al.
(2017)
4
Vicki Duscha,
Jan Kersting,
Sonja Peterson,
Joachim Schleich,
Matthias Weitzel
Technological development
of low-carbon power
technology and the
stability of international
climate cooperation
Duscha
et al.
(2016)
5 Jan Kersting
Stability of global
climate cooperation
under uncertainty
Kersting
(Forth-
coming)
6 Jan Kersting
Cooperation of
climate clubs
Kersting
(2015)
Table 1.1: Overview of the papers prepared for this thesis.
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2 Models of international
climate cooperation
This chapter first describes the game-theoretical model of international cli-
mate negotiations based on core stability by Chander and Tulkens (1995,
1997), hereafter CT model. The model provides the basis for the analyses
in this thesis. As the model is rooted in cooperative game theory, a brief
introduction into the topic and its relevant concepts is given, followed by the
specific setup of the CT model. Further, this chapter describes other stabil-
ity concepts present in the literature and their results. Finally, the different
concepts are compared and their applicability to the UNFCCC negotiations
is discussed.
2.1 Cooperative game theory and the core
Peleg and Sudhölter (2007) provide the following definitions. Let
N = {1, ..,n} be the set of players. Then a cooperative game with transfer-
able utility, or TU-game, is described by the value function v :R2n →R. We
say that v(S) gives the value for each possible coalition S ⊂ N of players.
As a normalization, v( /0) = 0 for all cooperative games.
Then, the question for each cooperative game is how to divide the value of
the grand coalition, v(N). An allocation of the value of a coalition S is a
vector x ∈ R|S| with
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ v(S). (2.1)
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An allocation can be interpreted as a proposed agreement among S. For
the grand coalition N, an allocation of its value is also called a payoff vec-
tor. This assumes that the value of the grand coalition can be freely dis-
tributed between the players, as indicated by the transferable utility label
of the TU-game.
A solution of a cooperative game is a function assigning a set of allocations
to each game. Different solution concepts exist. The focus in this thesis is
on the concept of the core. An allocation lies in the core if the value of no
coalition S is higher than its total allocated amount:
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) ∀S( N (2.2)
The condition ensures that no coalition has an incentive to deviate from the
proposed agreement. The core fulfills several desirable properties for solu-
tion concepts, such as Pareto optimality and individual rationality (Peleg and
Sudhölter, 2007, Chapter 2.3). Non-emptiness of the core can be checked
by comparing the value of the grand coalition to the joint value of all par-
titions of N, where a partition of N is a set of pairwise disjoint coalitions
containing all members of N. This idea is formalized and generalized in the
Bondareva-Shapley Theorem:
Theorem 1 (Bondareva 1962; Shapley 1967). The core of a cooperative
game is not empty if and only if
v(N)≥ ∑
S⊂N
δSv(S) (2.3)
for all balanced maps δ satisfying
∑
S⊂N
δS1i∈S = 1 ∀i ∈ N. (2.4)
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For the purposes of this thesis, an allocation is called stable if it lies in the
core. I also say that stable global cooperation is possible, if the core of the
corresponding game is non-empty. Note that the core only assesses stability
of cooperation among all players, not among certain sub-coalitions.
Other well-known solution concepts for TU-games are the ε-core, the kernel,
the nucleolus and the Shapley value. As they have no further relevance for
this thesis, the reader is referred to Peleg and Sudhölter (2007) and Rogna
(2016) for a detailed discussion of these concepts.
Further, the transferability of utility in cooperation games may also be re-
stricted. Such games are called cooperative games with nontransferable util-
ity, or NTU-games. Many solution concepts, like the core or the Shapley
value, have been adapted to NTU-games (see Peleg and Sudhölter, 2007, for
details). As this thesis only considers TU-games, the upcoming chapters will
refer generally to cooperative games when analysing TU-games.
2.2 The game of international
climate cooperation
In the CT model each country is represented by one player. Let N = {1, ..,n}
be the set of countries. The model then consists of the following components
for all countries i ∈ N:
• emissions Ei ∈ R.
• consumption function Ci(Ei) : R→ R, depending on a country’s own
emissions. It is assumed to be monotonically increasing up to a base-
line emission level E0i , differentiable and concave.
• damage function Di(EN) : R → R, depending on global emissions
EN = ∑i∈N Ei. It describes the damages incurred by environmental
pollution, climate change in this case. The function is assumed to
be monotonically increasing, differentiable and convex.
13
2 Models of international climate cooperation
Each country’s utility is determined by the difference of consumption
and damages,
ui(Ei,EN) =Ci(Ei)−Di(EN). (2.5)
Therefore, utility depends on the emissions of all other players, through the
damage function. In order to determine the value function v of the game,
assume that a coalition S ⊆ N forms. Members of the coalition maximize
the joint utility of all coalition members. As utility also depends on the
emissions of non-members, so-called outsiders, an assumption about their
behaviour is needed. This assumption is the essential difference between
different stability concepts. In the CT model, using core stability, it is as-
sumed that outsiders split up into singletons and maximize individual utility.
This so-called γ-assumption was first devised by Hart and Kurz (1983) for
a general coalition formation game. It leads to the following parallel opti-
mization problems:
max
(Ei)i∈S
∑
i∈S
[Ci(Ei)−Di(EN)] (2.6a)
max
E j
C j(E j)−D j(EN) ∀ j /∈ S (2.6b)
The resulting emission levels are sometimes referred to as a Partial Agree-
ment Nash Equilibrium (PANE). Denote by Ei(S) and E j(S) the PANE emis-
sion levels of coalition members and outsiders, assuming coalition S has
formed. Assigning the result of (2.6a) to v(S) defines the value function of
the cooperative game, allowing for the calculation of the core. Helm (2001)
showed that the core of the game is not empty for all functions fulfilling the
assumptions mentioned above1.
This result is a direct consequence of the γ-assumption. When a coalition
of countries decides on whether to deviate from the grand coalition, it takes
into account the reaction of the other countries, namely the dissolution of
1 Specifically, these are monotonicity, differentiability and convexity / concavity.
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any cooperation. Consequently, potentially deviating countries would face
higher emission levels, and the associated higher damages, if the deviation
was carried out. Therefore, an agreement can be designed to make global
cooperation stable.
It is important to note that the result of core non-emptiness also relies on
the possibility of monetary transfers. As shown in Equations (2.6), emission
levels of members of a coalition are determined to the benefit of all coali-
tion members. This is the cost-effective solution for the whole coalition,
but requires countries with low mitigation costs to emit less than would be
individually rational. In a stable global agreement, such countries need to
be compensated for their high mitigation efforts to incentivise them not to
deviate from the grand coalition.
Germain et al. (2003) analyse core stability of the dynamic game, i.e. the
game in which GHG emissions build up over several time steps and cooper-
ation is negotiated for each period. They show that the result of core non-
emptiness from the static game still holds, by providing a core-stable trans-
fer scheme for each time period. This dynamic analysis forms the basis for
the application of numerical models (Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003; Bréchet
et al., 2011; Dellink, 2011). The result of core non-emptiness is found to be
robust to varying slopes of the damage functions and to an economic update
of the numerical model (Bréchet et al., 2011). It also holds for a disaggre-
gation into six world regions (Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003; Bréchet et al.,
2011, using the ClimNeg World Simulation (CWS) model) and 12 world re-
gions (Dellink, 2011, using the Stability of Coalitions (STACO) model). All
studies also confirm the crucial role of transfers, as the allocation based on
globally cost-effective emission levels is not core-stable, but transfers can
construct a core-stable agreement. This result has also inspired an extension
of the core stability concept to a situation without transferable utility, but
with transferability of some other good (Kornek et al., 2014).
Currarini and Marini (2003) modify the core stability concept by allowing
for a “first-mover advantage” of a deviating coalition. In this setup, emission
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levels of different countries are no longer set simultaneously. Rather, the de-
viating coalition sets its emission level first and all outsiders determine their
emission level afterwards, by optimizing individual utility. In this setup, the
deviating coalition is also called the Stackelberg leader. The leader posi-
tion allows the deviating coalition to choose a relatively high emission level.
The outsider countries then react to the high global emission level and find
it in their best interest to choose a relatively low emission level. Therefore,
the first-mover advantage leads to a higher value for the deviating coalition.
Currarini and Marini (2003) show that, depending on the parameters of the
game, this can cause the core of the game to be empty.
2.3 Other stability concepts
2.3.1 Internal and external stability
The concept of internal and external stability is the most often used stability
concept for the analysis of international climate cooperation. It was orig-
inally introduced by D’Aspremont et al. (1983), who used it to study the
formation of a cartel of competing firms.
Assume that a coalition S has formed and a member i ∈ S evaluates the pos-
sibility of leaving the coalition. This player then assumes that after its devi-
ation, the rest of the coalition stays intact. Therefore, the player compares
its utility as a member of S to its utility as an outsider to the coalition of
the remaining members of S. If all members of S prefer to stay inside the
coalition, it is called internally stable:
ui(Ei(S),EN(S))≥ ui(Ei(S\{i}),EN(S\{i})) ∀i ∈ S. (2.7)
The right hand side in Equation (2.7), i.e. the utility a player would receive
outside of a coalition, is also called the outside option. In contrast to the
core stability concept, internal and external stability evaluates not just the
stability of the grand coalition, but of all possible coalitions. For non-global
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coalitions, stability also needs to be assessed against deviations by outsiders,
who might be better off after joining the coalition. A coalition S is called
externally stable, if no outsider has an incentive to join the coalition:
u j(E j(S),EN(S))≥ u j(E j(S∪{ j}),EN(S∪{ j})) ∀ j /∈ S. (2.8)
The conditions for internal and for external stability also show that the con-
cept only considers deviations from individual players, not from larger sets
of players, as was the case for core stability.
The main feature of the internal and external stability concept is the presence
of free-rider incentives. A player deviating from a coalition assumes that the
rest of the coalition stays intact. While this remaining coalition adjusts their
mitigation efforts to reflect the deviation, the new mitigation effort is still
larger than in the situation of all players acting as singletons. The additional
mitigation effort benefits all players, including the deviating player. How-
ever, the deviating player scales down its own mitigation effort after the de-
viation, because it considers only its own utility. Consequently, the deviating
player free-rides on the mitigation effort of the remaining coalition members.
The application of the internal and external stability concept to international
environmental agreements shows that a stable agreement can either have
many signatories with small mitigation effort, or few signatories with higher
mitigation effort, depending on the ratio of mitigation costs and benefits
(Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994). This is a direct result from
the presence of free-rider incentives, which are highest for a large coalition
with high mitigation effort. Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) provide an
analytical solution of the model and show that the “many signatories” case
resulted from a situation where countries abate more than they emit. If a
country’s emissions are required to be non-negative, the number of signa-
tories in a model with symmetric countries is 2, 3 or 4 (Diamantoudi and
Sartzetakis, 2006).
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In its original formulation, internal and external stability does not allow for
transfers between coalition members. This was remedied by the concept of
potential internal stability (Eyckmans and Finus, 2004; Carraro et al., 2006),
which is given if the total utility of all coalition members is larger than the
sum of the outside options of all members:
∑
i∈S
ui(Ei(S),EN(S))≥∑
i∈S
ui(Ei(S\{i}),EN(S\{i})). (2.9)
Under potential internal stability, the set of stable coalitions is slightly ex-
tended and includes some medium-sized coalitions (Carraro et al., 2006;
Bréchet et al., 2011; Bosetti et al., 2013). However, it does not influence
the stability of the grand coalition, which remains unstable.
Several numerical models have been applied to the internal and external sta-
bility setup (Bosello et al., 2003; Finus et al., 2005; Nagashima et al., 2009;
Bréchet et al., 2011; Dellink, 2011; Bosetti et al., 2013; Lessmann et al.,
2015). All studies confirm the result that only small coalitions are inter-
nally and externally stable, while some larger coalitions can be potentially
internally stable.
Dellink (2011) quantifies the size of the free-rider incentives. He finds that
the grand coalition would be stable if all countries would accept a loss from
cooperation of roughly 1% of GDP or larger. For the usual setup without
an acceptable loss from cooperation, Dellink (2011) also studies the impact
of several model parameters, including amount of climate damages, regional
damage distribution, mitigation costs, time horizon and discount rate. He
finds that the (lack of) stability of coalitions is quite robust to changes in
all parameters. For one parameter, the discount rate, Bosetti et al. (2013)
arrive at a different result. While they confirm that large coalitions are not
stable under a low discount rate, they find the grand coalition to satisfy po-
tential internal stability for a high discount rate. However, as a high discount
rate also implies rather low mitigation effort, the gain from cooperation in
the grand coalition is rather low. Lessmann et al. (2015) compare the exis-
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tence of stable coalitions under five different numerical models. While the
theoretical results are largely confirmed, the share of potentially internally
stable coalitions varies between 11% and 97% of all possible coalitions for
the different models. The differences are found to mainly result from varying
assumptions about climate damages in different regions.
Modifications
The largely grim results of the internal and external stability concept have
inspired various studies, which try to make larger coalitions stable by mod-
ifying or extending the basic model. For example, different shapes of the
functions underlying the model have been analysed. Karp and Simon (2013)
study the effect of the form of the mitigation cost function. First, they con-
firm the result of only small stable coalitions for convex marginal mitigation
costs. However, they also find that, if marginal mitigation costs are locally
concave, coalitions of all sizes may be stable, including the grand coalition.
Finus and Rübbelke (2013) account for additional private benefits of mitiga-
tion measures, also called co-benefits. They find that, while these benefits
increase mitigation efforts irrespective of cooperation status, they actually
have a neutral or negative impact on the size of stable coalitions.
Several studies assert that countries outside of a coalition incur an additional
cost, for example via trade penalties. Hoel and Schneider (1997) conclude
that the grand coalition can be stable if this cost is high enough. Barrett
(1997); Lessmann et al. (2009) and Nordhaus (2015) study the specific case
of trade penalties against outsiders of an agreement and find that this can
induce large stable coalitions. Helm and Schmidt (2015) combine this setup
with endogenous investments in research on low-carbon technologies. They
find that early investments make free-riding more attractive and that subse-
quent stable coalitions are therefore often inefficient. This conclusion is sup-
ported by Lessmann and Edenhofer (2011), who find that the combination
of a climate agreement with an agreement on mitigation technology research
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is less effective than a separate agreement on technology standards. Eichner
and Pethig (2015) also include international trade in the model and restrict
the policy instrument to emission taxes, not the usual emission caps. They
find that under this combination the grand coalition can be stable, due to the
presence of leakage effects under emission taxes. The presence of both inter-
national trade and emission taxes, as well as relatively low climate damages,
are necessary conditions for this result.
Further, some aspects of the design of a potential international climate agree-
ment have been analysed. Finus et al. (2005) study different membership
rules and voting schemes of an agreement, using a numerical model. They
find that exclusive membership, i.e. members of an agreement having to ap-
prove the accession of a new member, produces additional stable coalitions,
compared to the usual setup of open membership. Further, unanimity voting
on the accession of an outsider leads to more stable coalitions than majority
voting. Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2008) analyse an agreement of uniform
mitigation quotas for all members, instead of the usual cost-effective distri-
bution of mitigation effort. They find that this design supports larger stable
coalitions than the cost-effective mitigation distribution, although the grand
coalition remains unstable under all designs. Gerber and Wichardt (2009)
and McEvoy (2013) study deposit-refund systems as a mechanism for en-
forcement of agreements. Under such a system, all participants of an agree-
ment deposit an agreed amount of money to a neutral financial institution,
which returns the funds upon compliance with the set emission target. This
can lead to a stable grand coalition, if the deposit is high enough to encourage
compliance. Asheim et al. (2006); Finus and Rundshagen (2009) and Hagen
and Eisenack (2015) allow for multiple parallel agreements and find that this
can improve the number of cooperating countries and total mitigation efforts.
Dellink (2011) designates some countries as “essential players”, without
which no agreement is enacted by assumption. This moves the internal and
external stability concept closer to core stability, where all countries are “es-
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sential”. Dellink (2011) shows that appropriately chosen essential players
and transfers can make the grand coalition stable in this setup.
Finally, some studies considers a “threshold game”, in which catastrophic
climate damages occur abruptly at a certain level of emissions. Barrett
(2013) finds that, in this situation, no country has an incentive to leave
an agreement, if this would cause emissions to rise above the threshold
and the triggered damages are high. Consequently, large stable coalitions
are possible in this setup. Schmidt (2015) studies the threshold game in
a dynamic setting. He finds that this setup allows for further gains from
cooperation, as cooperating countries can allocate their mitigation effort
more efficiently over time.
For a more detailed overview of the literature on internal and external stabil-
ity, see Finus (2001, 2003); Barrett (2005) and Hovi et al. (2015).
2.3.2 Farsighted stability
The previous two stability concepts, core stability and internal and external
stability, differ mainly in the assumption a potentially deviating player makes
about the reaction by the other coalition members. While the internal and ex-
ternal stability concept assumes no change in coalition membership, the core
stability concept assumes the abandonment of cooperation. The concept of
farsightedness, introduced by Chwe (1994), proposes another assumption.
Here, the potentially deviating player assumes that its deviation would trig-
ger a sequence of moves by other players. If the new coalition created by
the deviation is not stable, further members would leave this coalition, or
new players would join. This process would continue until another stable
coalition is reached, and the utility of the originally deviating player in this
new coalition is his outside option. All players are assumed to be able to
rationally predict the emerging stable coalition and their outside option.
The farsightedness concept also enables the presence of multiple compet-
ing coalitions. Therefore it defines stable coalition structures, not just coali-
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tions. As a player considering a deviation compares the status quo to the
end-result of the emerging sequence of moves by the other players, the sta-
bility of a coalition structure depends on the stability of other coalition struc-
tures. Chwe (1994) therefore considers the “largest consistent set” of stable
coalition structures.
Ray and Vohra (2001) apply the concept to international environmental
agreements. In a model of symmetric countries, they show that for certain
numbers of players (n = 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 20, ...) the grand coalition is a
stable coalition structure. Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2002) extend the
model by allowing groups of countries to leave or join an agreement, not
just individual countries. They find that this stabilizes larger agreements.
In particular, they show that the grand coalition is farsightedly stable, if
coordinated moves by groups of countries are allowed.
Eyckmans (2001) and Osmani and Tol (2009) apply numerical models to
the concept and thereby drop the assumption of symmetric countries. Ey-
ckmans (2001) investigates the case of the Kyoto Protocol and finds that,
under a specific transfer rule, only few countries would benefit from leav-
ing the Protocol. Osmani and Tol (2009) calculate all farsightedly stable
coalitions in model of 16 world regions and also find that these coalitions
substantially improve global mitigation efforts and welfare, compared to the
situation without any agreement.
de Zeeuw (2008) combines farsighted stability with a dynamic model in
which countries choose their mitigation effort at several time steps. It might
then take some time for other countries to detect low mitigation efforts by
a deviating country. Under this modification, large stable coalitions in the
one-step model are no longer stable if damage costs are too high. However,
if damage costs are very low, compared to mitigation costs, large coalition
can be sustained.
Finally, Benchekroun and Ray Chaudhuri (2014) use farsighted stability to
study the effect of a sudden availability of cleaner technologies on the stabil-
ity of an agreement. They find that a small change in the emission intensity
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of an economy can result in a discrete change of the largest stable coalition.
Therefore, the availability of clean technologies may destabilize an otherwise
stable agreement, leading to lower global mitigation effort and welfare.
Overall, all studies find that farsighted stability supports larger coalitions
with higher total mitigation efforts and higher welfare, compared to stable
coalitions in the internal and external stability sense. The outside option
for a potentially deviating country is usually worse under farsighted stability
than under internal and external stability, because a deviation by one country
is met with further deviations by other countries, reducing total mitigation
efforts and thereby reducing welfare for the initial deviator. Consequently,
the free-rider incentive is reduced and a potential deviator might prefer to
instead stay in the agreement, making the agreement stable.
2.4 Comparison of stability concepts
This section briefly compares the different stability concepts. I start with a
short clarification. In the discussion on the merits of the different stability
concepts, core stability is often referred to as the approach of cooperative
game theory, while internal and external stability is referred to as the ap-
proach of non-cooperative game theory. This characterization is slightly mis-
leading. For the analysis of the stability of the grand coalition, the game us-
ing internal and external stability can also be written as a cooperative game,
by computing the outside option of the deviating countries, assuming the
non-deviating countries remain in a coalition (Tulkens, 1998; Breton et al.,
2006). A similar argument applies to farsighted stability, using the outside
option ultimately resulting from the sequence of moves triggered by a devia-
tion. In addition, it can be shown that, if an internally stable global agreement
exists, it is also core-stable (Tulkens, 2014). A further reconciliation of the
approaches is performed by Chander and Wooders (2010), who introduce
the “γ-core of an extensive game”, as is typically used in non-cooperative
game theory.
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Rather than the type of game theory, the key difference between the three
concepts lies in the assumed reaction of countries facing a deviation from
an agreement: no further change of cooperation (internal and external sta-
bility), breakup into singletons (core stability) or consideration of own de-
viation based on utility (farsighted stability). The core stability assumption
has been criticised, see e.g. Finus (2001). In particular, Finus takes issue
with the fact that core stability assumes a reaction of countries to a devi-
ation, but remains a static concept, i.e. the game occurs in only one time
step. However, the consideration of potential reactions is firmly in the tra-
dition of the Nash Equilibrium, which results from all players looking for a
best reply. Finus also points out that the threat of countries to breakup into
singletons is not renegotiation-proof and therefore considers the assumption
to be “not very plausible”.
However, I argue that for the analysis of climate cooperation under the UN-
FCCC, core stability best reflects the negotiation and decision making pro-
cess. As pointed out in Chapter 1, decisions under the UNFCCC require
“consensus”, meaning the support of all countries. Of the introduced sta-
bility concepts, this unanimity requirement is best represented by the core
stability assumption.
From a theoretical point of view, the γ-assumption is further justified in
Chander (2007), where it is shown that the assumption corresponds to the
behaviour in an equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game of international
pollution. Further, a similar assumption is also used in studies focused on
the bargaining process of international climate negotiations (Harstad, 2012;
Caparrós and Péreau, 2015).
Therefore, the core stability concept clearly merits more attention than it has
received in the literature so far. Its focus on unanimity and the distribution of
benefits of global cooperation is not found in internal and external stability or
in farsighted stability. Thereby, studies using core stability can complement
the analyses based on the other two stability concepts.
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Consequently, core stability forms the basis for all analyses in this thesis.
Some comparisons to results from the other stability concepts are incorpo-
rated where appropriate. It is also pointed out when selected questions should
be further analysed with a different stability concept.
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3 Cooperation on climate change
under economic linkages -
How the inclusion of macroeco-
nomic effects affects stability
of a global climate coalition
This chapter investigates the reliance of the high degree of cooperation un-
der the core stability concept on the underlying assumptions of the consump-
tion function. More specifically, we generalize the modeling of consumption
losses to incorporate international consumption effects of emission reduc-
tion measures. Current models are based on the assumption that a country’s
consumption loss due to emission mitigation measures only depends on the
country’s domestic emissions. This approach neglects the fact that in a glob-
alized world action in one country affects utility in other parts of the world.
An example: the introduction of extensive energy efficiency measures in
one country results in (i) a demand reduction for fossil fuels and (ii) cost
reductions for the energy efficiency measures applied. Hence, other coun-
tries can be affected by changes in fossil fuel prices and technology cost
changes. Further, competitiveness of firms is affected and hence changes
in world trade arise.
The aspect of a less domestically oriented consumption function is partic-
ularly relevant in cases where global mitigation activities are high, because
such action causes fundamental technological and economic change on a
global level. We therefore argue that the approach of taking purely do-
mestic consumption functions might be appropriate for the calculation of
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the non-cooperative equilibrium, when mitigation activities in all countries
are rather small. When calculating the value of coalitions applying (am-
bitious) mitigation targets, however, those international macroeconomic ef-
fects should be taken into account – an extension of the purely domestically
oriented consumption functions used by Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)
and Helm (2001).
Therefore, we modify the CT model by changing the definition of the con-
sumption function to include consequences of emission mitigation in mul-
tiple countries. In a second step, we apply the global computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model DART to quantify the consumption functions for
regions and countries. Bringing together these consumption functions with
damage functions taken from the RICE model (Nordhaus, 2010) allows us to
provide the value function of the game. Subsequently, we calculate the core
and the best partition of the game to check the stability of the grand coalition.
To our knowledge no attempt has been made so far to include the interna-
tional macroeconomic effects mentioned above into analyses applying the
core-stability concept. While, for example, the WITCH model (Bosetti et al.,
2013) includes macroeconomic effects, it has only been applied using the
internal and external stability concept. The previous numerical analyses ap-
plying core stability were based on models that did not include macroeco-
nomic effects. Moreover, the incorporation of macroeconomic effects means
that the utility functions may violate the assumptions used in the theoretical
proof of a non-empty core in the CT model by Helm (2001). This chapter
may therefore also be seen as an attempt at a counter-example to this result, if
assumptions about the form and dependence of functions are further relaxed.
Section 3.1 describes in detail our modifications of the CT model and the
numerical models used for our calculations. Section 3.2 presents the results
of the simulations. Section 3.3 discusses policy implications of our results.
Section 3.4 concludes and offers an outlook for future work.
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3.1 The model
The analyses in this chapter are based on the CT model, which is extended
to allow for international macroeconomic effects. These extensions are pre-
sented in Section 3.1.1. Our approach on the quantification of the value func-
tion used within the theoretical framework is presented in Section 3.1.2. Sev-
eral steps are necessary to derive the value function, including the application
of the global CGE model DART to calculate countries’ consumption func-
tions and of the RICE model (Nordhaus, 2010) to calculate global damages.
3.1.1 Game-theoretical model
We adapt the consumption function of the CT model to be able to include
the international macroeconomic effects mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter. In the extended CT model, the function no longer just depends on a
player’s own emissions, but rather on the vector of emissions of all players.
Ci =Ci(E), E = (E1, ..,En) (3.1)
This formulation ensures that emission mitigation measures by one or mul-
tiple players can influence consumption of third players. The interaction
occurs if the third player reduces emissions itself, as well as if it does not.
The optimization problems that determine the emission level of each player
are adjusted accordingly.
max
(Ei)i∈S
∑
i∈S
[Ci(E)−Di(EN)] (3.2a)
max
E j
C j(E)−D j(EN) ∀ j /∈ S (3.2b)
In the formulation of the consumption function in the original CT model,
the joint consumption function of a coalition was given by the sum of the
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consumption functions of the single players (singleton coalitions). In the new
modified model, there is no direct link between the consumption functions
of singletons and the joint consumption functions of larger coalitions, who
control the emission levels of all players within the coalition and include
international effects. Therefore, a fundamental assumption for the theoretical
result of a non-empty core by Helm (2001), namely the direct additivity of
consumption functions in a coalition, is violated in the new modified model.
To check whether the core of the modified game remains non-empty in all
cases is the main aim of the remainder of this chapter.
Due to the high complexity of international macroeconomic effects, a de-
tailed theoretical analysis of the modified model does not seem to be ap-
propriate. Instead, we quantify the consumption functions with a numerical
model, as outlined in the next section, without making prior assumptions
about function form. Therefore, the assumptions about function form made
by Helm (2001), namely monotonicity and concavity, might be violated by
some consumption functions, as briefly highlighted in Section 3.2.1.
3.1.2 Quantification of the game
Quantification of the value function
As outlined in Section 3.1.1, we calculate the utility of each region as the
difference between consumption and damages. Data on consumption and
damages are taken from two different models. For the calculation of the con-
sumption function we use the global CGE model DART. The application of
DART specifically allows covering the international macroeconomic effects
described above and included in the modified CT model. For the calculation
of the damage function we follow the approach by Nordhaus (2010).
As most impacts of climate change only become relevant over a longer time
frame (IPCC, 2013), we apply a time period from 2013 to 2300 for our cal-
culation of the value function. Note that due to using two separate models
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instead of an integrated model, feedback effects from changes in the climate
on the economic system are not included.
CGE model DART
The DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) model1 is a recursive dy-
namic CGE model of the world economy, covering multiple sectors and
regions. Producers in each region minimize cost of production while one
representative agent per region maximizes its consumption. The model cov-
ers all important market-based repercussions resulting from climate policies,
such as changes in the terms of trade due to a reduced demand of fossil fuels.
DART is calibrated to the GTAP dataset 8.1 (Narayanan et al., 2012) with
the base year 2007 and is aggregated to 12 sectors. The electricity sector
is further disaggregated into conventional (fossil based, thermal) generation
and generation from nuclear, hydro, wind, solar and biomass; carbon capture
and storage (CCS) is available as an option for electricity generation from
gas and coal (Weitzel, 2010). The costs of technologies are endogenous in
the model and change over time. For our game-theoretic analysis, we use
eight world regions based on countries’ similarities (see Table 3.1).
For this application the model is run up to 2050. In a baseline scenario that
assumes no climate policy, the model is calibrated to follow emission projec-
tions of the World Energy Outlook (International Energy Agency, 2013) and
GDP projections of the OECD Environmental Outlook (OECD, 2012). Con-
sumption functions are generated for all single regions (so-called singleton
coalitions), for the grand coalition of all regions, and for all possible com-
binations of regions in between, resulting in a total of 255 coalitions. The
functions are produced by implementing different emission reduction targets,
ranging from 22% to 66% below the baseline in 2050, and observing the
change in consumption over the time period 2013 - 2050. Emission reduc-
tions in the coalition region are achieved via a harmonized carbon tax, i.e. the
1 For a more detailed description of the DART model, see the appendix of Weitzel et al. (2012)
or https://www.ifw-kiel.de/academy/data-bases/dart_e.
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target of the coalition region is achieved cost-efficiently. In this step it is as-
sumed that no climate targets are enacted in regions outside of the coalition.
Regions used in
game-theoretical analysis
Countries or regions included
North America (NAM) Canada, US
Europe (EUR) Europe
Australia / New Zealand (ANZ) Australia, New Zealand
Japan (JPN) Japan
Fossil Fuel Exporters (EXP)
Middle East, North Africa,
Former Soviet Union
China (CHN) China
India (IND) India
Rest of the World (ROW)
Latin America, Africa,
Pacific Asia
Table 3.1: Regions in the game-theoretical model.
It should be noted that, as highlighted before, due to the incorporation of
international macroeconomic effects as in Equation (3.1), the consumption
functions for coalitions of more than one member do not directly result from
the consumption functions of single regions.
MATLAB’s pchip function is used to interpolate between the calculated
emission reduction targets. It produces a piecewise cubic polynomial with
continuous first derivative and preserves extrema and monotonicity of the
data. The algorithm is based on Fritsch and Carlson (1980).
The DART model calculates consumption and emissions up to 2050. We use
a simple procedure to extend the calculations to 2300. For baseline emis-
sions, we extrapolate per capita emissions for each region to 2100 based on
the linear trend of per capita emissions from 2030 to 2050. Population val-
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ues are based on the scenario for medium fertility of the UN World Popula-
tion Prospects (United Nations, 2012). This procedure leads to an emissions
path similar to the Representative Concentration Pathway RCP8.5, which
was used in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (Collins et al., 2013). We
then use the simple extension rule for RCP8.5 (Meinshausen et al., 2011)
to extend the baseline emissions path to 2300. This means constant emis-
sions from 2100 to 2150, followed by a linear reduction of annual emissions
to values consistent with stabilized atmospheric concentration in 2250, and
constant emissions afterwards. For emission reduction targets, we linearly
extend the trend in the relative reduction amount below baseline from the
period up to 2050. In subsequent years, absolute emissions are given by
baseline emissions multiplied by the extrapolated relative reduction amount.
The coalition is considered jointly, while the emissions of outsider regions
are calculated individually. The reduction of annual emissions is stopped
when a region or coalition reaches net-zero emissions.
The procedure for consumption is similar. Baseline consumption is extrap-
olated based on per capita consumption. Annual data from 2013 to 2300
is discounted and aggregated, resulting in the net present value (NPV) of
baseline consumption.
To reflect the intergenerational nature of climate change, the discount rate is
determined based on the Ramsey formula (Arrow et al., 2012). Accordingly,
the discount rate applied to a specific year is calculated as the sum of the
rate of pure time preference and the product of the elasticity of the marginal
utility of consumption and the per capita growth rate of consumption up to
the specific year. For the rate of pure time preference and the elasticity of the
marginal utility of consumption, we use the median values from a recent sur-
vey of economists (Drupp et al., 2015), which are 0.5% and 1, respectively.
The per capita growth rate of consumption up to a specific year is calculated
from the baseline consumption extension procedure described above. The
resulting discount rate starts at 3.3% and declines to 1.5% in 2300. This is in
line with the discount rate path advocated by Gollier and Hammitt (2014).
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The implementation of emission reduction targets results in a consumption
loss. This loss is simulated with the DART model for the period 2013 to
2050. For later years, we assume that the consumption loss relative to the
baseline stays constant at the value for 2050 for all years after 2050. This as-
sumption balances increasing consumption loss due to more expensive mit-
igation technologies needed to reach low emission levels, with decreasing
consumption loss due to the development and cost reduction of low-carbon
technologies over time. However, it can be seen as a rather conservative
assumption on consumption losses. For coalitions, the joint relative con-
sumption loss of all members is taken. Population values beyond 2100 are
based on the UN World Population to 2300 report (United Nations, 2004).
Damage function
For the regional damage functions, we use the Regional Integrated model of
Climate and the Economy (RICE)2. We use the baseline of the RICE-2010
version of the model, as described in Nordhaus (2010). Calculation of the
damages in each region for each year is a two-step process. In the first step,
the temperature change caused by a given level of cumulative CO2 emis-
sions up to the specific year is taken from RICE. The resulting temperature
changes range from 0.83°C to 6.61°C over the pre-industrial level. This does
not include a time component, i.e. the temperature change is the same if the
same level of cumulative CO2 emissions is reached in two different years3
. In the second step, the temperature change is used to calculate the dam-
ages in each region. For regions that differ between our model and RICE,
the values from the RICE model are disaggregated using 2013 GDP values
from the World Bank indicator database (World Bank, 2014). The RICE
model gives damages as a fraction of gross output. We convert these frac-
tions to absolute numbers using baseline consumption levels. RICE includes
2 http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/RICEmodels.htm
3 According to Collins et al. (2013, p. 1108), the amount of cumulative CO2 emissions is a good
indicator for the global temperature increase.
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two types of damages: those caused by sea level rise and other damages.
We include both types. This procedure generates absolute damages for each
region and year up to 2300. The cumulative NPV of damages is then cal-
culated using again the discount rate determined by the Ramsey formula, as
in the method for consumption.
Damage Scenarios
We implement three sets of damage scenarios. The damages given by the
RICE model form the basis for the default damages scenario. These esti-
mates are at the upper end of the range given by the IPCC (IPCC, 2014a)4.
In addition, we analyse two more damage scenarios: one scenario with dam-
ages only 50% as high as in the default damages scenario (low damages sce-
nario), which is still significantly above the lower range given by the IPCC,
and one scenario with damages twice as high as in the default damages sce-
nario (high damages scenario)5.
Game evaluation
The coalition and outsider regions choose their optimal emission level via
the control variable of 2050 emission reduction targets below baseline. We
find the equilibrium of emission reduction targets by successively calculat-
ing the best response of each region, starting with targets of one (meaning
no reduction below baseline) for all regions. In this procedure, the coali-
tion is treated as one entity, which controls a single joint emission reduction
target. Best responses are calculated using the multi-level single linkage al-
gorithm with low-discrepancy sequences by Kucherenko and Sytsko (2005).
This is a global optimization algorithm, which uses multiple starting points
for local optimizations. For the local optimization, we use the BOBYQA
4 See Section 3.2.1 for details.
5 As we consider only one decision based on future discounted values and damages tend to
occur later in time than consumption losses due to emission reduction measures, the reduction
(increase) in damages in the low (high) damages scenario could also be viewed as an increase
(decrease) in the discount rate.
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algorithm by Powell (2009). Both algorithms are supplied in the NLopt
package (Johnson, 2014).
Due to runtime constraints with the DART model, we could not calculate
consumption functions of outsider regions given a reduction target of a coali-
tion. These functions are needed when calculating the best response of an
outsider region. Instead, we use the consumption functions of the singleton
coalitions, in which each region assumes that no other region introduces a
reduction target, to calculate the best response emission reduction targets of
outsider regions. Morris et al. (2012) show that this does not have a major
impact on the optimal level of emission reductions. Rather, the consump-
tion function reacts with parallel shifts up or down if another region reduces
emissions. Therefore, this simplification does not have a considerable effect
on optimal emission reduction targets in equilibrium. As the value function
is determined by the sum of utility of coalition members, with no regard to
the utility of outsiders, the value function is only slightly affected. Also,
financial transfers between coalition members do not need to be explicitly
considered, because the value of a coalition is defined over the sum of its
members’ utility.
The analysis of the resulting game focuses on the existence of a stable payoff
vector, or, in other words, on the (non-)emptiness of the core of the game.
Therefore, we calculate the best partition of the game. A partition
P = {S1, ..,Sm} (3.3)
Sl ⊆ N,
m⋃
l=1
Sl = N, Sk ∩Sl = /0 ∀k, l ≤ m (3.4)
is a set of coalitions, in which each player is a member of exactly one coali-
tion. That is, a partition combines distinct cases (i.e. coalitions) for different
regions. The value of the partition is calculated as the sum of the values of
the coalitions. Consequently, the best partition of the game is the partition
with the highest value of all partitions. If the partition which only contains
36
3.2 Results
the grand coalition is not a best partition6, then the core of the game is empty,
as the value of the grand coalition is not high enough to satisfy each coalition
in the best partition7. In this case, we also calculate all other partitions with a
higher value than the grand coalition. These are called blocking partitions8.
3.2 Results
Results of the model are presented in two steps. In the first step, selected con-
sumption functions from the DART model and the damage functions from
the RICE model are presented, which serve as input for the game-theoretical
model. The second step focuses on the results of the core stability analy-
sis. As benchmarks we briefly present the cases of no cooperation and full
cooperation. All monetary values are provided as NPV, cumulated over the
entire model time period, 2013 - 2300.
3.2.1 Consumption and damage functions
The application of the DART model (see Section 3.1.2) produces functions
showing the change in consumption of each coalition for different 2050 emis-
sion reduction targets. Figure 3.1 shows these functions for all singleton
coalitions. To allow for better comparability across regions, consumption
changes are shown relative to each region’s baseline consumption. Note
that, while the emission target is based on a specific year, 2050, consump-
tion uses cumulative NPV. Table A.1 in Appendix A gives absolute baseline
consumption for each region.
6 It is possible for a game to have multiple best partitions with identical value.
7 In the language of cooperative game theory, the game is not cohesive.
8 Note that per the definition of the core of a cooperative game, there is no “stability” require-
ment for coalitions in blocking partitions. Such a requirement would assume “farsighted”
players (Chwe, 1994; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 2002), as outlined in Section 2.3.2. In
our model, the existence of one or multiple blocking partitions is merely used as a sufficient
condition for the emptiness of the core and does not make a statement on the outcome of the
game.
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Most regions only experience a relatively small decline in consumption be-
tween 0 and 0.6% of GDP for reduction targets between 0 and 30% below
baseline. The Fossil Fuel Exporters region EXP is an exception, as it expe-
riences the highest consumption loss of all regions.
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Figure 3.1: Consumption functions for singleton coalitions (NPV of consumption, relative
to baseline).
The consumption functions for almost all coalitions are monotonically in-
creasing and concave. An exception for monotonicity is the coalition {JPN,
IND}, which experiences a slight increase in consumption when reducing
emissions by up to around 20%. Also, several coalitions including CHN are
not concave for ambitious emission reduction targets. Hence, the two as-
sumptions of the form of the consumption functions by Helm (2001) do no
longer hold in these cases.
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Figure 3.2 shows regional damages for a given temperature increase over
the pre-industrial level, relative to baseline consumption, in the default dam-
ages scenario. According to the projections, the lowest relative damages are
expected to occur in the regions Australia / New Zealand, Japan and North
America. The highest damages are projected for the regions Rest of the
World, Fossil Fuel Exporters and China.
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Figure 3.2: Regional damages depending on temperature change in the default damages sce-
nario, relative to baseline consumption.
The figure also shows global relative damages, calculated as the average
across all regions, weighted by regional consumption. For a temperature
increase of 2◦C, damages are 2.0% of consumption on a global level in the
default damages scenario. This is at the upper end of the range given by
the IPCC (IPCC, 2014a).
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3.2.2 The gains of cooperation
In all damage scenarios, global cooperation leads to a substantial reduction
in cumulative CO2 emissions. Figure 3.3 shows the development of global
emissions over time in the “All Singletons” case, where each region opti-
mizes only its own utility, and in the case of global cooperation, where global
utility is optimized. Emissions are shown for all damage scenarios. The
baseline case without emission reduction measures in any region is shown
for comparison9. The baseline case leads to a temperature increase of ap-
proximately 5.9◦C in 2300 over the pre-industrial level.
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Figure 3.3: Global CO2 emissions in the “All Singletons” and “Global Cooperation” cases, for
all damage scenarios.
9 The baseline case can be interpreted as a scenario in which regions do not acknowledge the
existence of damages caused by climate change.
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In the default damages scenario, the “All Singletons” case results in a global
temperature increase in 2300 of 3.9◦C with annual emissions peaking in
2068. For global cooperation, the emission peak is reached in 2037 and
the emissions level is zero from 2117 onward, with a global temperature
increase of 2.5◦C in 2300.
In the low damages scenario, the “All Singletons” case produces a signifi-
cantly higher temperature increase of 4.4◦C in 2300. In case of global coop-
eration with low damages, annual emissions peak in 2057 and the emission
level reaches zero in 2154. The result is a temperature increase of 3.1◦C
in 2300.
In the high damages scenario, the emission path in the “All Singletons” case
is similar to the “Global Cooperation” case with low damages. Annual emis-
sions peak in 2053 and the temperature increase in 2300 is 3.2◦C. Global
cooperation with high damages produces the most ambitious emission path,
with a peak in 2023, an emission level of zero from 2089 onward, and a
temperature increase of 2.0◦C.
The differences in global and regional emission levels influence consump-
tion, damages and total utility. Table 3.2 shows these values, in addition to
CO2 emissions and the resulting temperature increase at the end of the time
period, as well as in 2100. For better readability, consumption and utility are
shown as consumption loss and utility loss, compared to baseline consump-
tion. All values are global, i.e. the sum of the values for all regions, and
aggregated over the whole time period.
In all damage scenarios, damages are reduced by moving from the “All Sin-
gletons” case to global cooperation: from $343tn to $298tn (-13%) in the
default damages scenario, from $202tn to $189tn (-6%) in the low damages
scenario and from $548tn to $453tn (-17%) in the high damages scenario.
Consumption losses due to emission reduction measures are small relative to
absolute consumption (as shown in Figure 3.1). Global cooperation reduces
consumption by $96.78tn in the default damages scenario, by $55.53tn in
the low damages scenario and by $148.61tn in the high damages scenario.
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3.2 Results
The results of the optimization for the “All Singletons” and “Global Cooper-
ation” cases are shown in Table 3.3. It displays the 2050 emission reduction
target of the given coalition and its utility loss in equilibrium for all dam-
age scenarios. The game-theoretic value of each coalition corresponds to the
baseline consumption of each coalition member, minus the displayed utility
loss. In the “All Singletons” case, the sum of the utility loss of the coalitions
gives the utility loss of the partition.
We find that global cooperation in the default damages scenario increases
utility by $44.87tn compared to the “All Singletons” case, an increase of
0.6% of the absolute utility value. This corresponds to a net-avoidance of
14% of damages compared to the “All Singletons” case.
We also find that there is a large difference in the ambition level in the “All
Singletons” case between different regions. In particular, China, India and
Rest of the World realize relatively ambitious targets, even without coop-
eration. For India, this is the result of modest emission reduction costs, as
seen in Figure 3.1. Rest of the World is the region with the highest relative
damages of all regions and therefore reduces emissions in the “All Single-
tons” case by 32%, 28% and 39% in the default, low and high damages
scenarios, respectively. China has the third highest relative damages and
consequently also reduces emissions substantially, despite having the second
highest emission reduction costs.
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Damage
Scenario
Low Default High
2050
emission
target
(rel. to
baseline)
Utility
loss
(NPV)
2050
emission
target
(rel. to
baseline)
Utility
loss
(NPV)
2050
emission
target
(rel. to
baseline)
Utility
loss
(NPV)
Partition
“Global
Cooperation”
72.57% 189.04 63.46% 298.36 50.05% 453.09
N 72.57% 189.04 63.46% 298.36 50.05% 453.09
Partition
“All
Singletons”
85.60% 202.03 79.95% 343.23 73.16% 548.44
{NAM} 93.78% 16.99 85.93% 28.97 75.74% 45.86
{EUR} 97.45% 14.77 94.62% 24.89 88.34% 39.52
{ANZ} 100.00% 0.24 100.00% 0.40 100.00% 0.64
{JPN} 99.74% 1.25 99.42% 2.13 98.79% 3.35
{EXP} 98.48% 27.45 94.34% 47.41 81.76% 79.85
{CHN} 85.70% 19.58 75.53% 32.67 72.90% 48.27
{IND} 74.83% 10.98 71.57% 19.20 66.18% 31.83
{ROW} 72.32% 110.77 68.07% 187.56 61.22% 299.13
Table 3.3: Utility of the “Global Cooperation” and “All Singletons” cases in all damage sce-
narios (utility loss in trillion 2007 US$).
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3.2.3 The cooperative game
The extreme cases “Global Cooperation” and “All Singletons” presented in
the last subsection provide a standard against which we can compare other
coalitions and partitions. As best partitions differ between scenarios, we
discuss each damage scenario separately.
Default damages scenario
Table 3.4 shows selected partitions, including the best partition, and the
respective targets and values of the member coalitions in the default
damages scenario.
2050 emission target
(rel. to baseline)
Utility loss
(NPV, tn$2007)
Partition
“Global Cooperation”
63.46% 298.36
N 63.46% 298.36
Partition
“All except ANZ”
63.59% 297.50
N\{ANZ} 63.25% 297.10
{ANZ} 100.00% 0.40
Partition
“All except ANZ, JPN”
64.95% 297.30
N\{ANZ, JPN} 64.23% 294.77
{ANZ} 100.00% 0.40
{JPN} 99.42% 2.13
Table 3.4: Selected partitions in the default damages scenario.
We find that the “Global Cooperation” partition is not a best partition of the
game in the default damages scenario, as we find partitions with lower utility
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losses than the grand coalition. That is, we find the core of the game to be
empty, contrary to the original CT model. In this scenario, a partition has the
highest utility if it consists of the coalition of all regions except Australia /
New Zealand (ANZ) and Japan (JPN), and ANZ and JPN as singleton coali-
tions. In total, utility loss of the best partition is $297.30tn, compared to
$298.36tn in the grand coalition.
Our result arises, because a stable global agreement would have to cover
against two cases simultaneously: the “All Singletons” case and the case of
partial cooperation by a group of regions with high benefits from emission
reductions, a coalition of the willing.
Consider first the region ANZ, a large exporter of fossil fuels, mainly coal.
To illustrate its motivations, it is useful to look at the partition “All except
ANZ”, which is worse than the best partition, but still better than the “Global
Cooperation” partition. When global utility is optimized in the grand coali-
tion, global emissions in 2050 are 63.46% of baseline emissions. In the “All
Singletons” case, the regionally optimized targets lead to a global average
emission level of 79.95% of 2050 baseline emissions. Consequently, nega-
tive consumption effects for ANZ occur when moving from the “All Single-
tons” case to global cooperation, due to lower global fossil fuel demand and
prices. The driver behind this finding is the assumption that regions expect
an “All Singletons” outcome if they do not participate in the grand coalition.
Consequently, ANZ would need to be compensated for its consumption loss
to be motivated to join the grand coalition. This compensation would have to
come from the coalition of the willing, in this partition consisting of all other
regions. However, when this coalition optimizes its emission level, it does
not need to incorporate the wishes of ANZ. This leads to a more ambitious
emission reduction target of 63.25% in the coalition of the willing. While
global emissions in the case of the coalition of the willing are still larger
than in the grand coalition (global average target of 63.59%, compared to
63.46% in the grand coalition), the difference is rather small, because ANZ
only has relatively few domestic emissions, compared to the coalition of the
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willing. Therefore, the coalition of the willing only experiences very small
gains from moving to global cooperation. These additional gains are not
large enough to offset the consumption loss of ANZ.
The motivation for JPN is different and stems from the fact that it experiences
the second lowest damages from climate change, after ANZ. As the eco-
nomic situation of ANZ causes global cooperation to be unstable, JPN now
faces the choice between the “All Singletons” case and joining the coalition
of the willing described above. Due to the low damages experienced by JPN,
the cost of the additional emission reduction effort required by a coalition
of the willing outweighs the reduction in damages. Consequently, JPN also
blocks global cooperation and the best partition is “All except ANZ, JPN”.
It should be noted that the economic effects described above for ANZ also
apply to the Fossil Fuel Exporters region EXP. However, this region also
experiences the second highest damages from climate change. Therefore,
the damage reduction caused by global cooperation outweighs the loss of
fossil fuel export revenue for EXP.
The blocking partitions shown in Table 3.4 are not all blocking partitions that
exist in the default damages scenario. In total, four such partitions exist, all
consisting of ANZ and/or JPN as blocking regions, in addition to a coalition
of the willing of the remaining regions.
In this default damages scenario, the difference in utility loss between global
cooperation and the best partition is quite small. This is further underscored
by the small number of blocking partitions. The next section shows that a
reduction of damages increases both the utility deficit of global cooperation
and the number of blocking partitions.
Low damages scenario
Table 3.5 shows selected partitions, including the best partition, in the low
damages scenario.
47
3 Cooperation on climate change under economic linkages
2050 emission target
(rel. to baseline)
Utility loss
(NPV, tn$2007)
Partition
“Global Cooperation”
72.57% 189.04
N 72.57% 189.04
Partition
“All except ANZ”
72.73% 187.44
N\{ANZ} 72.48% 187.20
{ANZ} 100.00% 0.24
Partition
“All except ANZ, JPN”
73.30% 184.18
N\{ANZ, JPN} 72.75% 182.69
{ANZ} 100.00% 0.24
{JPN} 99.74% 1.25
Partition
“All except
ANZ, JPN, CHN”
75.41% 183.95
N\{ANZ, JPN, CHN} 72.62% 163.00
{ANZ} 100.00% 0.24
{JPN, CHN} 83.41% 20.71
Table 3.5: Selected partitions in the low damages scenario.
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We find that “Global Cooperation” is not the best partition of the game and
hence again the core of the game is empty. The best partition comprises
ANZ as a singleton, a coalition of JPN and CHN, and a coalition of the will-
ing of the remaining regions. Utility loss in the best partition is $183.95tn,
compared to $189.04tn in the case of global cooperation. This difference is
substantially larger than in the default damages scenario.
The behaviour of ANZ is caused by the same effects described in the default
damages scenario. JPN again sees no benefit in joining the coalition of the
willing, due to its low damages, compared to other regions. CHN’s behaviour
can be explained by the consumption loss due to emission reductions. For
CHN, this is the third-highest of all regions (see Figure 3.1). Therefore,
CHN also does not benefit from joining the coalition of the willing. How-
ever, as CHN does already reduce its emissions by roughly 15% in the “All
Singletons” case, it can cooperate with JPN to better distribute these emis-
sion reductions. This reduces the joint consumption loss of CHN and JPN,
as JPN has low emission reduction costs.
In total, we find 80 blocking partitions in the low damages scenario,
a substantial increase over the four blocking partitions in the default
damages scenario.
High damages scenario
Table 3.6 shows selected partitions, including the best partition, in the high
damages scenario.
We find that – in contrast to the other two damage scenarios - “Global Co-
operation” is the best partition of the game in the high damages scenario and
that the core of the game is not empty, in line with the original CT model.
Table A.2 in Appendix A shows one core-stable payoff vector.
The different outcome in this high damages scenario is driven by high gains
from cooperation, which are induced by the relatively high damages. Both
the inclusion of JPN and the inclusion of ANZ into the coalition of the willing
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2050 emission target
(rel. to baseline)
Utility loss
(NPV, tn$2007)
Partition
“Global Cooperation”
50.05% 453.09
N 50.05% 453.09
Partition
“All except ANZ”
50.39% 454.24
N\{ANZ} 49.93% 453.60
{ANZ} 100.00% 0.64
Partition
“All except ANZ, JPN”
51.58% 458.68
N\{ANZ, JPN} 50.59% 454.69
{ANZ} 100.00% 0.64
{JPN} 98.79% 3.35
Partition
“All except
ANZ, JPN, CHN”
59.34% 484.84
N\{ANZ, JPN, CHN} 54.71% 432.91
{ANZ} 100.00% 0.64
{JPN, CHN} 72.57% 51.29
Table 3.6: Selected partitions in the high damages scenario.
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without those two regions lead to a gain in utility. While both regions have
only low damages compared to other regions, their damages in this scenario
are high enough that even they benefit from a move from “All Singletons”
to “Global Cooperation”.
However, the economic effects which drove the results in the low and default
damages scenarios are still apparent in the emission targets of the high dam-
ages scenario. The target in the case of “Global Cooperation” (50.05%) is
still less ambitious than the preferred targets of the remaining coalition, when
ANZ is excluded (49.93%). This means that, while ANZ prefers “Global Co-
operation” to “All Singletons”, it still favours a less ambitious target than the
other regions. Therefore, to include ANZ in the joint target, the target be-
comes less ambitious. Nevertheless, these economic effects are outweighed
by the high gains from cooperation in the high damages scenario.
Basic model without international effects
The previous subsections showed that our model can produce a game with
empty core in some circumstances. This is in contrast to the original CT
model, which always produces games with non-empty core. To show that
this is not an artefact of the specific set up of the numerical model, we also
analyse the core of the game if we do not take international effects of emis-
sion reductions into account. For that, an alternative version of the model is
constructed, based only on the singleton consumption functions. The result-
ing model thus replicates the assumption of the original CT model that the
joint consumption function of a coalition is given by the sum of the domestic
consumption functions. Table 3.7 shows the results for the “All Singletons”
case, the grand coalition and the selected partitions shown in prior sections.
Consistent with the theoretical result by Helm (2001) and previous numeri-
cal applications of the core stability concept (Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003;
Bréchet et al., 2011; Dellink, 2011), we find that the core of this game is
non-empty in all damage scenarios. Consequently, we conclude that our de-
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viating results in the model with modified consumption functions are driven
by this modification.
Damage
Scenario
Low Default High
2050
emission
target
(rel. to
baseline)
Utility
loss
(NPV,
tn$2007)
2050
emission
target
(rel. to
baseline)
Utility
loss
(NPV,
tn$2007)
2050
emission
target
(rel. to
baseline)
Utility
loss
(NPV,
tn$2007)
Partition
“Global
Cooperation”
69.35% 152.87 62.38% 253.91 50.65% 410.90
N 69.35% 152.87 62.38% 253.91 50.65% 410.90
Partition
“All except ANZ”
69.69% 154.03 62.77% 256.43 51.11% 416.10
N\{ANZ} 69.41% 153.79 62.43% 256.03 50.65% 415.47
{ANZ} 100.00% 0.24 100.00% 0.40 100.00% 0.64
Partition
“All except
ANZ, JPN”
70.20% 155.30 63.49% 259.12 51.99% 421.31
N\{ANZ, JPN} 69.59% 153.80 62.75% 256.59 51.01% 417.32
{ANZ} 100.00% 0.24 100.00% 0.40 100.00% 0.64
{JPN} 99.74% 1.25 99.42% 2.13 98.79% 3.35
Partition
“All except
ANZ, JPN, CHN”
73.92% 176.68 67.36% 288.03 58.50% 468.18
N\{ANZ, JPN, CHN} 70.31% 155.65 64.49% 252.96 53.66% 416.11
{ANZ} 100.00% 0.24 100.00% 0.40 100.00% 0.64
{JPN, CHN} 84.45% 20.79 75.28% 34.67 72.38% 51.43
Partition
"All Singletons"
85.60% 202.03 79.95% 343.23 73.16% 548.44
Table 3.7: Selected partitions in the basic model without international effects (utility loss in
trillion 2007 US$).
Note: Values for the individual regions under the “All Singletons” partition are identical to those
presented in Table 3.3.
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3.3 Policy Implications
Our results imply that, under the assumption that damages from climate
change are not higher than the range given by the IPCC, it is not possible
to design a straightforward global climate agreement, based on emission re-
duction targets and including all countries, under the UNFCCC. This is true
even if all countries assume that there will be no coalition without them as
a member, i.e. they neglect the existence of free-riding incentives. In our
model, a global agreement is blocked by the consumption loss of a major
fossil fuel exporter, who would experience revenue losses due to lower fossil
fuel prices in a world with ambitious global GHG mitigation. All blocking
countries assume that without their agreement no cooperation will take place
at all, leaving them better off when not joining the coalition.
For the set of remaining countries, which we refer to as coalition of the will-
ing, this situation presents two options. The first option is to stick to the
idea of a global agreement under the UNFCCC and provide incentives for all
countries to join. This would mean compensating the fossil fuel exporters for
their consumption losses. Such compensation for the impacts of “response
measures” is an essential demand by oil exporting countries, represented in
the group of Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), in the UNFCCC
negotiations (LMDC, 2014). However, the results of our model indicate that
such compensation measures would not be rational from the perspective of
the coalition of the willing, as the additional avoided damages are not enough
to make up for the consumption loss. As compensatory measures are not
rational from an economic perspective, the incentive to compensate and in-
centivize blocking countries to join the coalition would have to come from
other political reasoning. Fairness principles often discussed in the context
of burden sharing, such as historic responsibility for the climate problem and
the ability to pay for the solution, are one example. Countries could also
be motivated by the aspiration to avoid a large temperature increase and the
accompanying risk and regionally differentiated impacts. In addition, the
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required compensation amount is small compared to total consumption (see
Table A.1 in Appendix A). Therefore, if the decision is not based purely on
a benefit-cost analysis of GHG mitigation but other arguments are taken into
account, the coalition of the willing, or parts of it, could reasonably incen-
tivize blocking countries to join the global climate agreement.
The second option for the coalition of the willing is to abandon the UNFCCC
process and try to consummate an agreement among this coalition. This op-
tion would not be as environmentally effective as a global agreement, but
could be close to it, depending on the exact specification of the coalition.
Non-global climate clubs have been proposed as a solution for the climate
problem in the literature (e.g. Eckersley, 2012; Weischer et al., 2012; Nord-
haus, 2015) and initiatives exist for certain sectors and/or gases10. The idea
of climate clubs will be further evaluated in Chapter 6.
Although our pessimistic result might seem to be caused solely by the ANZ
region, the effects driving the result might be more impactful than the model
is able to depict. Take the Fossil Fuel Exporters region, which also experi-
ences large economic effects from global emission reductions. However, it
does not cause a blocking partition, because it has the second highest dam-
ages of all regions and therefore benefits from global cooperation. However,
the high damage estimate for this region is largely driven by the Middle East
and North Africa and might not apply to Russia and other Former Soviet
Union countries. These countries with high economic losses from global
emission reduction measures and low climate damages might cause further
blocking partitions in a model with higher regional disaggregation.
Nevertheless, our model implies that high gains from cooperation reduce
blocking incentives and make a stable global agreement seem possible.
Therefore, the promotion of the positive effects of emission reduction
10 For example, the REDD+ Partnership supports measures to reduce emissions from deforesta-
tion, and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition is focused on short-lived GHGs. See Weischer
et al. (2012) for an overview of climate clubs.
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measures and further re-search in this area might improve the prospects
of a global agreement.
3.4 Conclusion
We argue that a main weakness of earlier analyses on coalition stability stems
from the fact that consumption functions are usually assumed to depend on
domestic reductions only, while this is clearly not the case in a globalized
world. Therefore, we extend the model by Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)
to include international macroeconomic effects of emission reduction mea-
sures in multiple regions and quantify the new value function by applying
two models, the DART model and the RICE model.
Contrary to the original theoretical paper and previous numerical applica-
tions, we find that, under the assumption that climate damages are in the
IPCC range, the grand coalition in this setting is not stable. In the best par-
tition of our default damages scenario, Japan and the fossil fuel exporting
region Australia / New Zealand act as singletons, while a coalition of the will-
ing of the remaining regions agrees on a joint emission reduction target. Aus-
tralia / New Zealand stands to lose a substantial part of its fossil fuel export
revenue, if global emission reduction measures are implemented and fossil
fuel prices fall as a result. Therefore, as long as the region believes that it can
block international cooperation by not signing off on a global agreement, it
has no incentive to join an agreement, which does not include adequate com-
pensation. This effect is amplified in a scenario with lower damages.
In contrast, under higher damages, no blocking partition exists and a stable
global agreement is possible. While the economic effects mentioned above
are still apparent, the high gains from cooperation, due to higher damages,
outweigh all other effects in this scenario.
Our results point to alternative ways forward, if blocking partitions exist. The
coalition of the willing of non-blocking countries can make the decision to
compensate the blocking regions for their loss of consumption in the case of
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global cooperation. Such a decision would not be rational from the perspec-
tive of a pure benefit-cost analysis based on climate damages avoided and
consumption loss, but might be reasonable if other factors such as historic
responsibility or risk aversion are included. Alternatively, the coalition of
the willing could terminate the quest for a global agreement and form a cli-
mate club outside of the UNFCCC. If designed properly, such an agreement
might include very broad participation (Hovi et al., 2015).
Our model could be improved in a number of ways. It does not include a full
feedback of the optimization of emission levels to the consumption side, in
the way that integrated assessment models do (Leimbach et al., 2010; Nord-
haus, 2010; Bosetti et al., 2013). Also, the model is static, meaning that the
decision on the optimal emission level is only taken once. A dynamic version
of the model could include decisions each year or every few years (de Zeeuw,
2008). In addition, a higher number of world regions is needed for a detailed
analysis of countries’ blocking incentives. Furthermore, despite the long
time frame, the model does not include uncertainty about the future values
of the consumption and damage functions (Dellink and Finus, 2012; Barrett,
2013; Finus and Pintassilgo, 2013). These issues are left for further research.
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4 Technological development of
low-carbon power technology and
the stability of international
climate cooperation
To achieve ambitious emission reduction targets, techno-economic analyses
typically advocate investments in a mix of low- and no-carbon technologies,
along with carbon dioxide removal technologies for the energy sector, which
currently accounts for roughly two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions
(e.g. International Energy Agency (IEA), 2015). Most of the extant literature
assumes that the potential and costs of future technologies are known with
certainty. Yet, estimations of the technological progress of a low-carbon
technology, the development of its costs and its actual diffusion are highly
uncertain. For example, carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology was
expected to become one of the key bridging technologies for decarbonizing
the energy system. In its 2008 World Energy Outlook, the IEA estimated
that CCS would be applied to 9% of global fossil fuel based power genera-
tion capacity in 2030, in a 2◦C target scenario (IEA, 2008). Six years later
this figure had dropped to about 5% (IEA, 2014b). In many countries, CCS
suffers from a lack of social acceptance and the necessary regulatory frame-
work (e.g. for sequestration). Thus, investors in CCS currently face substan-
tial market, policy, and technology uncertainties (e.g. von Hirschhausen et
al., 2012; IEA, 2007). In comparison, the deployment of solar photovoltaic
(PV) technology turned out to be much more dynamic than expected. The
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80% drop in the costs of modules in mature markets between 2008 and 2012
(IEA, 2014a) was startling.
Some studies employing techno-economic models have explored the impact
of technological uncertainty on global and regional mitigation costs (Clarke
et al., 2015). CCS availability is typically found to significantly affect overall
mitigation costs (e.g. Krey and Riahi, 2009; Kriegler et al., 2014). Yet these
studies tend to be rather aggregate and assume a benevolent dictator to de-
termine the burden-sharing of mitigation costs among countries. In reality,
countries’ mitigation efforts are more likely to be the outcome of political
decision making and are driven by regional costs and benefits. While, ac-
cording to Weitzel (2015), the fossil fuel market effects cancel out at the
global level, the regional mitigation costs are more sensitive to technolog-
ical uncertainty. Lüken et al. (2011) and Weitzel (2015, 2016) analyse the
effects of technological uncertainty on regional mitigation costs and on the
distribution of costs across countries. Assuming cooperation of countries,
these studies find that the main source of uncertainty in mitigation costs is
uncertainty about technology deployment in specific regions and the ramifi-
cations of this on the international fossil fuel markets. These impacts include
changes to the world market price of fuels in response to carbon pricing.
Only few game-theoretical studies have allowed for uncertainty about miti-
gation costs in analyses of the stability of climate cooperation (e.g. Hong and
Karp, 2014; Kolstad and Ulph, 2011; Finus and Pintassilgo, 2013; Dellink
and Finus, 2012). These studies focus on the effects of uncertainty and
risk aversion on the decision-making of countries, aspects that are further
analysed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. However, the studies do not consider
whether different technological pathways can themselves influence the sta-
bility of climate coalitions. Also, technological uncertainty in these studies
is based on the mitigation cost function for a generic technology and not
for specific technologies. In addition, these studies do not account for the
general equilibrium effects of emission reduction measures (e.g. fossil fuel
market effects). However, the findings of Chapter 3 suggest that these ef-
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4.1 Methodology and Technology Scenarios
fects can substantially change the conclusions about the stability of climate
coalitions. To the best of our knowledge, so far no study has included indi-
rect cost effects and technological uncertainty when analyzing the stability
of climate coalitions.
In this chapter, we simulate the impact that different technological assump-
tions about key low-carbon power technologies have on the stability of global
climate cooperation and analyse the resulting burden sharing. We specifi-
cally take into account that assumptions about mitigation costs as well as
the benefits of climate protection may differ across regions. Our concep-
tual framework builds on the model constructed in Chapter 3. Again, the
numerical application uses sets of consumption functions from the CGE
model DART, which has been augmented by technology-specific informa-
tion on wind, PV and CCS plants for this purpose. These technologies
typically account for a significant share of the electricity mix in climate
protection scenarios1.
We first explore the stability of global cooperation under different technolog-
ical assumptions, similar to Chapter 3. Then, we derive scenarios to analyse
the global and regional effects that influence the stability results. Finally, we
discuss the outcomes of the different scenarios in depth for key regions.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 describes
the integration of technological uncertainty into the DART model and the de-
rived scenarios. Section 4.2 presents the results, focusing on the effects of the
varying assumptions about the development of key mitigation technologies
on cooperation and burden sharing. Section 4.3 concludes.
4.1 Methodology and Technology Scenarios
In this chapter, the analysis of Chapter 3 is extended by two additional
technology scenarios and the associated cooperation cases. This section
1 For example, in the 2◦C target scenario of the 2014 World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2014b), wind,
PV and CCS account for 17%, 13% and 7% of global electricity capacity in 2040, respectively.
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describes the modeling approach for the integration of technological un-
certainty into the DART model and the derived scenarios for the game-
theoretical analysis.
4.1.1 Technological uncertainty in the power sector
To integrate technological uncertainty into the DART model, three in depth
studies were undertaken for on-shore wind power (Capelli, 2014), solar PV
(Renz, 2012) and CCS (Lämmle, 2012). An extensive review of the liter-
ature provided information on the ranges of the key parameters describing
the future development of each technology including capital costs, learning
rates, energy output and lifetime of the technology. The core findings for
the three technologies are:
• The market for on-shore wind power is dominated by a single design,
the three-bladed horizontal axis turbine. The future costs of generating
electricity from on-shore wind power primarily depend on the learning
rate, which captures the reduction in per unit electricity generation
costs for a doubling of global capacity. The literature review shows
values between 12% and 18% for the learning rate.
• Solar PV technologies vary by scale and where they are mounted (roof,
facade, ground) and scale of the plant, giving rise to differences in
installation costs and power output. However, the cost structure for
all PV technologies is quite similar, as the major cost factor is the PV
module (Renz, 2012). Therefore, the future cost development of all
PV technologies can be captured using the same learning rate, which
varies between 15% and 23% in the literature.
• The future development of CCS is more complex than wind or PV.
Adding CCS to any process increases the capital costs required to cap-
ture, compress, transport, and store the CO2. Operating costs also
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increase, because CCS implies a loss in production efficiency. There-
fore, the best approach to modeling the future electricity generation
costs of CCS is to apply a region- and technology-specific (gas and
coal) markup, i.e. the additional cost of a unit of electricity produced
in a CCS plant, compared to a reference non-CCS plant. This markup
captures learning rates for individual components and efficiency penal-
ties. The markup ranges between 31% and 53% for a gas-fired plant,
and between 51% and 96% for a coal-fired plant. CCS can be applied
in other industry sectors, e.g. cement or iron and steel, but this chapter
focuses on its application in the power sector.
Based on these findings, the future cost development of PV and wind power
is modeled via a learning-curve approach with an uncertain learning rate,
while for CCS, technological uncertainty is modeled as a deviation from the
expected markup (see Weitzel, 2015, for more details). The resulting param-
eter means and standard deviations are summarized in Table 4.1. Based on
this we derive an optimistic and a pessimistic technology scenario, where the
relevant parameters for all technologies mark the 99% confidence interval of
the implemented distribution. These values are also shown in Table 4.1.
LR-Wind LR-PV
Markup
CCS-Gas
Markup
CCS-Coal
Mean 15.0% 19.0% 42.0% 74.0%
Standard deviation 1.4% 1.6% 5.0% 10.0%
Pessimistic scenario 11.7% 15.2% 53.0% 96.0%
Optimistic scenario 18.3% 22.8% 31.0% 51.0%
Table 4.1: Uncertainty and scenario parameters in DART.
The use of the DART model in this chapter is twofold: First, we employ
DART to generate the sets of consumption functions that are used in the
game-theoretical model to examine the stability of a global climate coalition,
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as described in Section 3.1. Since our focus is on the implications of tech-
nological uncertainty, consumption functions of all possible coalitions were
created for the pessimistic, mean and optimistic technology scenario, thus
extending the results of Chapter 3, in which functions from the mean sce-
nario were used. Second, DART is used to analyse the global and regional
effects of technological uncertainty in key scenarios in more detail.
4.1.2 Scenarios
In total, there are three different technology scenarios: mean, optimistic (opt)
and pessimistic (pess) (see Table 4.1). For each scenario, several coopera-
tion cases can be distinguished, which result in different emission targets
for each region.
The baseline case - or business-as-usual (BAU) case - without emission re-
ductions is used as the reference. We then use the game-theoretical model to
calculate emission reductions for different cooperation cases for each of the
three technology scenarios. These are the case of global cooperation (GC)
of all regions and the “All Singletons” (AS) case, where each region indi-
vidually maximizes its utility. As in Chapter 3, we also calculate the best
partition to determine the stability of global cooperation for each scenario.
For simplicity, this chapter presents the best coalition (BC), which we de-
fine as the coalition that causes the highest global value. The global value
caused by a coalition is the value of the partition consisting of this coali-
tion and the remaining regions as singletons. Results show that this special
case corresponds to the best partition in each scenario. In addition, we call
each coalition that causes a global value higher than GC a blocking coalition.
Blocking regions are regions that appear as outsiders to a blocking coalition.
All four cooperation cases (BAU, AS, BC, GC) are analysed in detail with the
DART model by taking the emission reductions from the game-theoretical
model and combining them with the underlying technology scenario. Emis-
sion reductions are implemented via a uniform tax in GC or BC that is en-
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dogenously calculated to reach the specified reductions. Reductions of sin-
gleton regions in AS or potentially of outsider regions in BC are achieved
via unilateral taxes.
Further, as a sensitivity analysis, we also vary the level of damages due to
climate change, as in Chapter 3. The focus of this chapter is on the de-
fault damages scenario, in which damages are taken directly from the RICE
model. We also run the game-theoretical model for the low damages sce-
nario, in which damages are half those in the default damages scenario, and
the high damages scenario, in which damages are twice as high as in the
default damages scenario. In total, we calculate the combinations of three
technology scenarios, three damages scenarios and four cooperation cases,
for a total of 36 scenarios, of which the 12 default damages scenarios are
analysed in more detail in this chapter.
4.2 The influence of technological uncertainty
on cooperation and burden sharing
This section analyses the effects of different technological assumptions on
the stability of a global climate coalition and the feasible burden sharing.
As described in Section 4.1, consumption functions were generated for the
mean, pess and opt technology scenarios, which were then used in the game-
theoretical model to determine the stability of global cooperation. The de-
fault damages scenario is applied, unless otherwise indicated.
4.2.1 Cooperation in the different scenarios
Table 4.2 shows the emission levels for the “All Singletons” case, the grand
coalition and selected other cooperation cases resulting from the game the-
oretical model. Percentage changes provided in brackets show emission
changes compared to BAU with the same technology assumptions.
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Generally, more optimistic technology assumptions lead to lower emission
levels, even in the BAU scenario, while relative reductions do not show a
clear trend. As expected, global emissions under “All Singletons” are much
higher than under a grand coalition. These reductions are mainly driven by
regions with relatively high damages, namely CHN, IND and ROW, while
the other regions reduce their emissions only marginally. Global cooperation
in contrast reduces emissions by roughly 36% below BAU.
Scenario pess mean opt
BAU 56.3 55.6 53.9
All Singletons 44.8 (-20.4%) 44.5 (-20.0%) 42.4 (-21.3%)
Grand Coalition N 35.5 (-36.9%) 35.3 (-36.5%) 34.4 (-36.2%)
N\{ANZ} 35.7 (-36.5%) 35.4 (-36.3%) 34.5 (-36.0%)
N\{ANZ, JPN} 35.9 (-36.2%) 36.1 (-35.1%) 34.0 (-36.9%)
Table 4.2: Global emission levels (in GtCO2) and % changes to the BAU with the same tech-
nology assumptions in 2050 caused by selected cooperation cases in different tech-
nology scenarios under default damages.
While the differences in emission levels across technology scenarios are not
large on a global level, there are differences in cooperation among coun-
tries. We find that, for default damages, the grand coalition N is not stable
for any technology scenario. Instead, other possible coalitions result in a
higher global value (the global values for all relevant coalitions are provided
in Table B.1 in Appendix B). In the opt scenario and the mean scenario, the
best coalition consists of all countries except ANZ and JPN. While ANZ and
JPN are the only blocking regions in the mean scenario, two more blocking
regions exist in the opt scenario, namely EUR and EXP. In particular, the
coalitions N\{ANZ, JPN, EXP}, N\{EUR, ANZ, JPN} and N\{EUR, JPN}
also result in a global value higher than the grand coalition, although this is
still lower than the best coalition N\{ANZ, JPN}.
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In the pess scenario, we find a different best coalition, consisting of all re-
gions except ANZ. This is the only blocking coalition in this scenario, in-
dicating that global cooperation is “closer” to being stable than in the mean
and opt scenarios. In particular, JPN is not among the blocking countries, in
contrast to the other two scenarios.
The resulting emission levels of the best coalition are very close to those of
global cooperation (see Table 4.2) For the coalitions without ANZ and JPN,
the emission levels remain slightly higher, because the mitigation benefit
of ANZ and JPN is not accounted for by the remaining regions, and vice
versa. An exception here is the N\{ANZ, JPN} coalition in the opt scenario,
which shows the lowest global emission levels of all scenarios. This is caused
by low marginal mitigation costs for N\{ANZ, JPN} in the emission range
implied by default damages. Marginal mitigation costs for N are higher,
leading to higher optimal emissions.
Results for the other damages scenarios are summarized in Table 4.3. This
shows the best coalition for all scenarios, the global emission level caused by
the best coalition, the total number of blocking coalitions in each scenario,
and all the regions that act as singletons in any of the blocking coalitions. The
values for each coalition by scenario are given in Table B.1 in Appendix B.
The results indicate that high damages due to climate change encourage co-
operation, as the grand coalition is stable for the mean and pess scenarios
and only three blocking coalitions exist in the opt scenario, confirming the
results of Chapter 3. In contrast, there are many blocking coalitions if dam-
ages are low, particularly in the opt and mean scenarios. The best coali-
tion in these two scenarios consists of only five regions, with three regions
blocking cooperation.
That higher damages tend to favor cooperation is a direct consequence of
region’s incentives. Higher damages also mean higher benefits from miti-
gation for all regions. Therefore, even regions with economic disincentives
for global mitigation efforts, like the blocking countries above, might prefer
global cooperation to “All Singletons”, if this greatly reduces damage costs.
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The pess scenario produces the lowest number of blocking coalitions among
all the damages scenarios, while the opt scenario always produces the high-
est number. Overall, higher damages and more pessimistic technological
assumptions both tend to favor stable global cooperation. The drivers behind
these findings are investigated in the following sections.
4.2.2 Global effects and regional burden sharing
To analyse the direct effects of the technological assumptions and especially
the indirect effects due to cooperation in more detail, we analyzed all de-
fault damages scenarios with the DART model. Comparing the best coali-
tion (BC) to the case of global cooperation (GC) sheds light on the indirect
effects due to cooperation. Table 4.4 summarizes the major global variables
for these scenarios.
The effects of the different technological assumptions are small2 for both
global consumption and global emissions, and there is little difference be-
tween the GC and the BC cases. Thus, on a global level technological vari-
ations in the electricity sector have neither a significant direct nor a signifi-
cant indirect effect due to changes in cooperation. Absolute consumption is
slightly higher for the opt scenarios and lower for the pess scenarios. Direct
mitigation costs, as reflected in carbon prices, are highest in the pess scenar-
ios, but since this is not the case for the total effects reflected in the consump-
tion levels, this is obviously offset by indirect effects, due to e.g. changes in
comparative advantages, trade flows and energy market effects. Vice versa,
emissions are slightly lower for opt and this is mostly also the case for mean
scenarios compared to pess scenarios. The exception is that more coopera-
tion in the pess scenario, compared to the mean scenario, leads to a lower
global emission level in the pess scenario, though the difference between
GC and BC remains below 3%. Note also that, due to carbon leakage, the
2 For a detailed discussion of the role of the uncertainties in the power sector and a discussion
why overall effects are only small see Weitzel (2015).
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emissions of the non-cooperating region ANZ, which does not undertake any
mitigation efforts in BC, are higher than in the BAU scenario. Both coop-
eration cases (BC and GC) entail significant emission reductions relative to
BAU. Cooperation furthermore plays a role for the direct mitigation costs
reflected in carbon prices. With less cooperation, the carbon price is higher
for the coalition for the opt and pess scenarios, with a visible increase of
almost 5% in the opt scenario, when both ANZ and JPN do not cooperate.
Interestingly, under mean technology assumptions the price in BC is 15%
lower than in GC. This is caused by the shape of the consumption function
for N\{ANZ, JPN}, which is steepest under mean assumptions, inducing the
least ambitious relative emission target in the BC scenario (see Table 4.2)
and therefore requires only a relatively low carbon price to reach the target.
Table 4.4 also shows the electricity and oil prices for the the different scenar-
ios. As expected, for BAU both prices are lower under optimistic technology
assumptions. Also, the effects of emission reductions are significant in GC
and technological assumptions matter. Electricity prices increase under mean
and pessimistic technology assumptions, because more expensive renewable
electricity is produced under climate constraints. For optimistic assumptions
prices fall, because faster progress in learning about solar energy dominates
other effects. Oil demand and prices under GC are highest for pessimistic
technology assumptions. In the BC case, the different cooperation cases
yield more diverse patterns. Figure 4.1 shows the resulting electricity pro-
duction in 2050, in petawatt-hours (PWh). In all cases, more electricity is
produced under more optimistic technological assumptions, and the share of
renewables and CCS increases with emission reductions. For solar, there is a
visible increase especially in the optimistic scenarios. One significant effect
of cooperation is that fossil fuel use without CCS in the pess and mean BC
scenarios is around 2%/ 7% higher than in the GC case. A major driver for
this is the different level of carbon prices. These changes go hand in hand
with differences in the use of CCS. CCS use is 1.4%/ 3.8% lower in BC
than in GC for pess/mean technology assumptions, respectively, but 1.4%
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higher for the opt scenario. Total fossil electricity production (fossil + CCS)
is very similar in GC and BC and differs by no more than 2.1% under mean
technology assumptions.
pess mean opt pess mean opt pess mean opt0
20
40
60
10.62
12.68
15.62
10.76
13.18
15.4
42.46
40.51
35.84
21.07
19.56
15.06
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Figure 4.1: Global electricity production in 2050 by scenario (default damages scenarios).
Turning to the regional effects, Table 4.5 shows the change in consumption
for the different regions in 2050 relative to the BAU scenario with the same
technological assumptions. Indirect effects on the macro level can be seen
by comparing the cooperation cases AS, BC and GC. As expected, differ-
ences between GC and BC are visible for ANZ and JPN, while these are
small for the regions that do not change their cooperation behaviour. Abso-
lute levels are heavily influenced by whether a region exports fossil fuels and
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loses export revenue under emission reductions (especially EXP and ANZ)
or whether the region is an energy importer that profits from cheaper fos-
sil fuels net of carbon prices when emissions are reduced (especially IND,
JPN, EUR and CHN).
AS BC GC
pess mean opt pess mean opt pess mean opt
NAM 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.8 -1.9 -2.2 -1.8 -2.0 -2.1
EUR 0.4 0.4 0.3 -0.6 -1.4 -2.0 -0.6 -1.4 -1.9
ANZ -3.3 -2.6 -1.9 -3.3 -2.7 -2.1 -5.0 -4.6 -4.1
JPN 0.7 0.6 0.3 -0.3 0.1 -1.4 -0.4 -1.1 -1.6
EXP -1.7 -1.5 -1.0 -7.0 -6.4 -6.2 -7.1 -6.6 -6.1
CHN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.1
IND 1.3 1.1 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.6
ROW -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -1.3 -1.3 -1.6 -1.3 -1.3 -1.5
Table 4.5: Change in consumption in 2050 by scenario, relative to the BAU scenario with the
same technological assumptions, in % (default damages scenarios).
In the electricity sector, indirect effects on renewable production are visible,
also mainly for ANZ and JPN. This is discussed in detail in the context of
cooperation drivers in Section 4.2.3. The difference between BC and GC
is smaller for the other regions that are only affected by non-cooperation of
JPN and ANZ. In contrast, the global shift from fossil without CCS to fossil
with CCS is especially apparent in the mean and opt scenarios. This can be
seen in Table 4.6, which shows the change in fossil electricity production
without and with CCS in BC compared to GC, in terawatt-hours (TWh).
Under pessimistic technology assumptions, significant differences between
BC and GC in fossil electricity production with and without CCS are only
found in ANZ and JPN. This changes under more optimistic assumptions. In
the mean scenario, which features a big drop in the carbon price between BC
and GC (see Table 4.4), NAM produces significantly more fossil electricity
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pess mean opt
w/o
CCS
with
CCS
w/o
CCS
with
CCS
w/o
CCS
with
CCS
NAM -17 3
73
(+38.9%)
-23 0 2
EUR -10 -3 12 -23
-33
(-3.6%)
30
ANZ
418
(420%)
-93
(-100%)
485
(inf*)
-145
(-100%)
336
(inf*)
-159
(-98.3%)
JPN
17
(11.2%)
-20
(-9.2%)
332
(inf*)
-243
(-73.7%)
102
(inf*)
-99
(-26.3%)
EXP 0 -6 0 -12 0 19
CHN -23 2 168
-57
(-12.2%)
-422
(-6.2%)
223
(27.5%)
IND -6 -14 78 -3
-210
(-4.9%)
74
(15.1%)
ROW -4 -18 12 8
-194
(-5.6%)
131
(3.9%)
World 374 -147
1.162
(+6.3%)
-499
(-3.8%)
-421 220
Table 4.6: Change in electricity production from fossil energy sources with and without CCS
in the BC case, compared to the GC case (in TWh, default damages scenarios).
*No fossil production without CCS in GC
Bold figures - % changes ≥ 3%, % change shown in brackets
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without CCS (and a little less with CCS) in BC. The same thing happens in
CHN with the difference that the decrease in CCS electricity production is
higher in relative terms. Under optimistic technology assumptions, the shifts
are even larger. Here, the carbon price is higher in BC, and CHN, IND, ROW
and to a lesser degree also EUR produce significantly less fossil electricity
without CCS and more electricity with CCS.
In summary, the indirect effects of different technology assumptions are rel-
atively small on a global level, but are visible in the energy systems on a
regional level. Under pessimistic assumptions, the effects are visible primar-
ily for ANZ and JPN, while under mean and optimistic assumptions, there
are significant changes to the regional patterns of fossil electricity produc-
tion with and without CCS.
4.2.3 Drivers of cooperation
To explain the drivers of cooperation and how the technological assumptions
affect the incentives for cooperation, it is necessary to look at both climate
damages and consumption losses from mitigation measures. To shed light
on the latter, we again use the results from DART and compare the AS and
the GC cases.
The greater the damages due to climate change for a region, the higher its
incentives to mitigate emissions and engage in cooperation. For this reason,
regions with generally higher damages (EXP, ROW) have a greater incentive
to cooperate. Across scenarios this incentive is higher with higher global
emissions (shown in Table 4.2) and higher resulting damages. While cooper-
ation reduces emissions by 9.3 GtCO2 and 9.2 GtCO2 in the pess and mean
scenarios, respectively, the reduction in the opt scenario is only 8 GtCO2.
Thus the incentives to cooperate are lower in the opt scenario, so that it is
no surprise that this technology scenario produces the highest number of
blocking coalitions. To recall, the regional order of damages can be seen in
Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3.
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Consumption losses, measured here for the year 2050, are driven by three
factors (see Peterson and Weitzel, 2015): direct mitigation costs, indirect
mitigation costs, which are mostly driven by the effects on fossil fuel exports
and imports, and finally the cost of or income from permit trading, which
is not relevant for our analysis. Theoretically, the incentives resulting from
cheaper renewables and CCS are unclear and depend, for example, on market
shares and production with and without emission reductions.
We investigated the incentives of regions in more detail. Regions are (a)
affected to varying degrees by changes in technological assumptions and (b)
experience different consumption losses when moving from “All Singletons”
to global cooperation. Figure 4.2 shows both effects.
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Figure 4.2: Effects of technology scenarios, consumption losses, and damages for all regions
(default damages scenarios).
The effect of technological assumptions (a) is measured as the difference in
consumption loss across the different technology scenarios in the GC case,
as shown in Table 4.5. Since the difference in consumption between AS and
GC (b) drives the cooperation decision in the game-theoretical model, this is
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also derived from Table 4.53. Finally, the incentive to cooperate is influenced
by the amount of damages in each region, as outlined above. The size of each
region’s bubble in Figure 4.2 corresponds to the default damages of a region
for a temperature increase of 2◦C.
For NAM, CHN, IND, and ROW, the effects of the different technological
assumptions are rather low so that the incentives to cooperate remain stable
across technology scenarios. These regions always support global coopera-
tion since there are only small or medium consumption losses between GC
and AS. ANZ with low climate damages never has an incentive to engage
in cooperation, even though the difference between GC and AS is not so
different from, e.g., NAM. For JPN and EUR there is a medium difference
between AS and GC, but technological differences matter most. As Table 4.3
shows, the negative effects of emission reductions in the opt scenario (EUR
and JPN) and the mean scenario (JPN) lead to some blocking behaviour. For
EXP, the mitigation costs under cooperation are high, but so are the gains
due to reduced damages, which dominate in pess and mean. In opt, there
is some incentive to defect even though this shows the lowest differences
between GC and AS.
For regional burden sharing, these results imply that technological assump-
tions directly affect the burden of EUR and JPN and to a smaller degree also
of EXP and ANZ. In three of these cases, EXP, JPN and EUR, the techno-
logical assumptions also affect the willingness to cooperate and through this
mechanism the burdens of other regions. In the case of EUR (EXP) this is
only the case for two (one) suboptimal blocking coalitions under opt assump-
tions, while JPN defects for optimistic and mean assumptions in the best
partition. ANZ, on the other hand, always blocks. The regional incentives
to cooperate are analysed now in more detail for the four blocking regions.
We start by discussing the incentives for ANZ and JPN, whose defections
produce the best coalitions, and then move on to EUR and EXP.
3 The difference between AS and GC in Figure 4.2 represents the average difference over all
technology scenarios.
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For ANZ, damages from climate change are low and provide little incentive
to mitigate unilaterally. As the mitigation costs are in line with other sin-
gle regions for modest emission targets, ANZ’s ratio of mitigation costs and
damages is so high that ANZ does not mitigate emissions at all in AS. The
move from AS to GC thus means that its economy moves from zero car-
bon prices to prices of 250 – 280US$/tCO2 in 2050, implying a reduction of
emissions and emission intensity by 58% to 65% in the different technology
scenarios in 2050. For comparison, emission reductions in GC compared to
AS for all other regions except EXP are only around 20-30% (NAM, EUR,
JPN, IND) or even negligible (ROW, CHN).
Figure 4.3 shows electricity generation in 2050 for the different scenarios.
Since ANZ does not implement any carbon prices in BAU, AS, and BC,
electricity production patterns are very similar. Fossil fuel production even
increases in AS and BC, compared to BAU, because the lack of a carbon
price in ANZ gives the region a comparative advantage relative to the other
regions. By not joining the coalition, ANZ’s energy system in BC is almost
the same as in AS for pess and mean. Under optimistic technology assump-
tions, ANZ produces more solar and wind in AS than in BC, where ANZ
has a larger comparative advantage in fossil fuel production, due to the large
difference in carbon prices to the other regions. In the GC scenario, the en-
ergy system looks very different with drastically reduced fossil electricity
production that is also mostly equipped with CCS.
The high absolute consumption losses as the result of emission reductions are
also driven by reduced export revenues for fossil fuels (which are 30-45%
lower in GC and BC compared to BAU in 2050 with the same technology
assumptions). Under optimistic technology assumptions, changes in export
revenues from fossil fuels also incentivize cooperation: In GC-opt they are
almost 20% lower than in AS-opt in 2050. Under pessimistic and mean
technology assumptions, however, export revenues are about 3% higher in
GC than in AS, but these small changes do not lead to cooperation and the
effects of increased carbon costs dominate.
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Figure 4.3: Electricity production in ANZ in 2050 by scenario.
JPN has only few domestic energy resources and relies on fossil fuel imports
for over 90% of its energy needs (U.S. Energy Information Administration,
2015) so that it benefits from stricter emission reductions and reduced fossil
fuel use. On the other hand it experiences the second lowest damages of all
regions and thus benefits only marginally from additional emission reduc-
tions in the case of global cooperation, compared to “All Singletons”. As
Table 4.5 shows, the difference in economic costs between the two cases
is relatively high under mean and optimistic technology assumptions, and
lower under pessimistic assumptions, which explains why JPN does not de-
fect in this case. Figure 4.4 shows JPN’s electricity mix.
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Figure 4.4: Electricity production in JPN in 2050 by scenario.
In the mean scenario, JPN reacts to global cooperation by switching its fossil
fuel based electricity production to CCS, while leaving all other sources of
electricity almost unchanged. This indicates that further expansion of non-
fossil electricity production4 is not economically viable for JPN, as the best
locations for renewable electricity have already been exploited under “All
Singletons”. CCS remains the best mitigation option in the electricity sector,
enhancing JPN’s reliance on fossil fuel imports. JPN even increases its fossil
fuel imports when aiming at ambitious emission targets under global coop-
4 Note that for all countries and all scenarios electricity production from nuclear is fixed exoge-
nously. This approach reflects that the use of nuclear power is a political decision rather than
an economic one.
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eration, because CCS requires higher resource input for the same amount
of electricity due to efficiency losses. In sum, JPN does not benefit from
reduced emissions or from lower fossil fuel imports in the case of global
cooperation, but still has to pay for the costs of decarbonizing its electric-
ity production. Therefore, it prefers “All Singletons” to global cooperation
in the mean scenario.
A similar situation occurs in the opt scenario. As it is still not economically
viable for JPN to substantially expand its renewable electricity production,
JPN has to switch its fossil fuel based electricity production to incorporate
CCS under global cooperation, while significantly reducing the total amount
of electricity produced. Consequently, JPN again prefers “All Singletons”
to global cooperation. The situation is more favorable in the pess scenario,
where JPN’s emission target (in absolute terms) under GC is less ambitious
and hence JPN only has to apply CCS to part of its fossil fuel based elec-
tricity production, while slightly reducing the overall amount of electricity
produced. These changes are quite modest compared to the transformation
in the mean and opt scenarios. Consequently, JPN does not block global
cooperation in the pess scenario.
As fossil fuel exporters, EXP is negatively affected by global emission re-
ductions. EXP has a strong incentive to block global cooperation, because its
revenues from exporting fossil fuels in 2050 are 5-6% higher under “All Sin-
gletons” than under global cooperation for all technological assumptions. Its
emissions are 50% lower in GC than in AS and it faces large consumption
losses when moving from AS to GC. The cooperation of EXP in pess and
mean, and mostly also opt, is driven by the significant damages in EXP due
to climate change. These damages also vary substantially between different
technological scenarios. Table 4.7 shows the climate damages for EXP for
all default damages scenarios, in the cases of “All Singletons” and global
cooperation, as well as the corresponding relative damage reduction.
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pess mean opt
All Singletons 56.02 55.70 50.74
Global Cooperation 32.11 32.24 31.63
Damage reduction -42.68% -42.12% -37.66%
Table 4.7: Damages in the EXP region by scenario in the cases of “All Singletons” and global
cooperation (default damages, BAU-mean = 100).
While the damage reduction induced by global cooperation is similar in the
pess and mean scenarios, it is significantly lower in the opt scenario. This
is directly related to the change in global emissions for each scenario, as
referenced above, which is lowest in the opt scenario. Consequently, the
cooperation benefit for EXP is substantially lower in the opt scenario than
in the other scenarios. This explains why EXP acts as a singleton in some
blocking coalitions in the opt scenario, while it does not do so in the mean
and pess scenarios.
EUR is characterized by a combination of medium damages and relatively
high direct mitigation costs. It profits from lower costs for fossil fuel imports
under global emission reductions, but these effects are not large in total (sav-
ings of a maximum of 5% in 2050 in GC relative to AS). Under pessimistic
and mean technology assumptions, damages dominate again, but the gains
from cooperation are smaller under optimistic assumptions, where emissions
reductions due to global cooperation are lower (see the case of EXP). Also,
the change in consumption is clearly the highest in the opt scenario (see Ta-
ble 4.5), which explains why EUR sometimes defects.
In summary, technological assumptions make a difference for cooperation in
JPN, EXP and EUR. The main drivers are
• smaller additional emission reduction under optimistic technological
assumptions and the resulting smaller damage reduction through co-
operation. This is relevant for EUR and EXP.
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• larger increase in mitigation costs for global cooperation that results
from changes in the energy system. This is relevant for JPN.
4.3 Conclusion
We found that the stability of global climate cooperation varies depending
on the assumptions made about the development of key low-carbon power
technologies, wind, solar photovoltaic and carbon capture and storage, and
those made about climate related damages. Global cooperation was found
to be stable in the scenarios with mean or pessimistic assumptions about
the development of key low-carbon power technologies and when climate
damages are high. In contrast, no stable outcome was achieved in scenarios
assuming optimistic technological development (for all damage scenarios)
or when climate damages were low or at the default level (for all technology
assumptions). The best coalition did vary with assumptions about techno-
logical development for all damages scenarios.
The main blocking region in our analysis is Australia / New Zealand, which
is not willing to participate in the grand coalition in any case in which global
cooperation is not stable. In these cases (unstable grand coalition), Australia /
New Zealand is not willing to mitigate any emissions at all, since the welfare
losses due to carbon prices in this very coal-intensive region outweigh the
(generally low) benefits of cooperation due to reduced climate damages.
For the second main blocking region, Japan, cooperation depends on the as-
sumptions about the technological development of the key mitigation tech-
nologies. Under default damages, Japan only supports global cooperation for
pessimistic technological assumptions, due to a relatively unambitious emis-
sion target, which mostly prevents the need for an expensive transformation
of the electricity sector.
In general, under more optimistic assumptions about technological develop-
ment, other regions (Europe and the region of fossil fuel exporting countries)
were also found to be less cooperative and defect in some partitions. This is
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caused by the varying benefits of cooperation (in the form of damage reduc-
tion), which are lower under more optimistic assumptions about technolog-
ical development. The result is similar to that in Helm and Schmidt (2015),
who find that early investments in research and development decrease the
attractiveness of cooperation.
These regional impacts mean that international burden sharing is affected by
assumptions about technological development both directly through chang-
ing welfare effects and indirectly through varying cooperation behaviour. As
we model technological uncertainty about electricity generation technolo-
gies, the electricity system is affected the most. For the default damages
scenario, which was analysed in more detail, the effects are primarily visi-
ble in the domestic electricity system of blocking regions under pessimistic
assumptions about technological development. For mean and optimistic as-
sumptions about technological development, the global patterns of fossil fuel
and CCS electricity production change significantly and most regions are af-
fected. Renewable energy production depends more on the technological
assumptions themselves and less on cooperation.
In sum, this chapter shows that different assumptions about climate damages
and the costs of key mitigation technologies can substantially affect the re-
sults concerning technology deployment and regional burden sharing, and
hence the stability of global climate cooperation. In situations of unstable
global cooperation, non-global climate clubs have been proposed as a way
of tackling for the climate cooperation problem (e.g. Grasso and Roberts,
2014; Nordhaus, 2015). Our findings generally support the proposition that
a different solution might be needed. The idea of climate clubs is further
investigated in Chapter 6.
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While the previous chapter analysed the implications of different future path-
ways for technological development, it did not look at the direct impact of
uncertainty on the stability of climate cooperation. However, it stands to rea-
son that countries incorporate uncertainty into their decision making and that
uncertainty might change optimal emission levels. Therefore, incentives to
cooperate might also be affected, especially if countries have different pref-
erences about behaviour under uncertainty.
Further, while Chapter 4 mainly considered the uncertain pathways of tech-
nological development, future damages from climate change are also highly
uncertain. While several effects of climate change are well understood, their
economic effects are still quite uncertain (IPCC, 2014a). Many current esti-
mates also do not account for certain factors likely to influence the impact of
climate change, such as changing weather patterns or tipping points (Burke
et al., 2015; IPCC, 2014a).
In the past years, several game-theoretic models based on internal and exter-
nal stability have been expanded to include uncertainty about one or multiple
parameter values. Bramoullé and Treich (2009) find that uncertainty about
the impact of a global pollutant can have a positive environmental effect, as
risk averse polluters reduce their emissions. However, Benchekroun and van
Long (2013) find that this result does not hold up in a dynamic game with
a stock pollutant. Barrett (2013) analyses a threshold game and finds that
uncertainty about the threshold causes cooperation to be unstable.
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A few studies have included uncertainty about mitigation costs. Hong and
Karp (2014) use a theoretical model with uncertainty in the mitigation cost
parameter and find that higher risk aversion of countries increases member-
ship in a stable climate agreement, but reduces mitigation levels. Kolstad
and Ulph (2011) and Finus and Pintassilgo (2013) use a similar theoreti-
cal model with uncertainty in the benefit-cost ratio of mitigation. They find
that such uncertainty can increase the size of a stable coalition, if countries
are symmetric under uncertainty, but asymmetric after the true nature of the
parameter is revealed. However, this negative effect of the removal of un-
certainty can mostly be avoided by a suitable transfer scheme (Dellink and
Finus, 2012). Dellink et al. (2008) employ a numerical model and find that
uncertainty in the mitigation benefit parameters has a larger influence on the
stability of coalitions than uncertainty in the mitigation cost parameters.
To the best of my knowledge, no attempt has been made to introduce un-
certainty into a model of international climate cooperation using core stabil-
ity. This is despite the good alignment of the concept with the international
climate negotiations and the striking result of the deterministic model, as
described in Chapter 2. However, the underlying concept of a cooperative
game has been extended into a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs
(Suijs et al., 1999; Timmer et al., 2005), including modified definitions of
preferences, the objective function of coalitions, allocations, and of the core.
Two distinct allocation concepts are put forward by Suijs et al. (1999) and
Timmer et al. (2005).
This chapter provides the first inclusion of uncertainty in a model of inter-
national climate cooperation using core stability. In particular, this chapter
determines whether the result of stable global cooperation in the determinis-
tic model carries over into a model with uncertainty. The game is extended
into a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs, based on adapted prefer-
ences and objective functions. I analyse two model setups, one including
technological uncertainty and one including uncertainty in climate damages.
84
5.1 Uncertainty in a model of climate cooperation
Further, I check the (non-)emptiness of the core for both allocation concepts
put forward in the literature, for both types of uncertainty.
Section 5.1 gives a general overview of the model and the different game-
theoretic concepts. Section 5.2 analyses the model with technological uncer-
tainty, while Section 5.3 analyses uncertainty in climate damages. Section
5.4 situates the results in the general context of international climate negoti-
ations and policy. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.1 Uncertainty in a model of
climate cooperation
The model in this chapter is based on the original theoretical CT model.
This means that the international economic effects that were the focus of
Chapters 3 and 4 are no longer present in the model going forward. The
absence of these effects allows for an independent analysis of the pure im-
pact of uncertainty.
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, either the consumption or the dam-
age function are modified to include uncertainty. They become a stochastic
variable. Consequently, the utility of player i also becomes a stochastic
variable Ui:
Ui(Ei,EN) =Ci(Ei)−Di(EN). (5.1)
In order to define the cooperative game with stochastic payoffs, some ad-
justments to the deterministic CT model are needed, following Suijs et al.
(1999). As payoffs are now stochastic, a preference ordering i is needed,
which indicates whether player i prefers one stochastic payoff to another.
This chapter uses the specific preference ordering proposed by Suijs et al.
(1999). Let αi ∈ (0,0.5] and qαi(X) be the αi-quantile of payoff X . Then
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player i prefers payoff X to payoff Y if and only if the αi-quantile of payoff
X is larger than the αi-quantile of payoff Y :
X i Y :⇔ qαi(X)≥ qαi(Y ). (5.2)
This means that qαi(X) is the certainty equivalent of payoff X , cei(X). For
payoffs with symmetric distribution1, αi = 0.5 implies risk neutral behaviour
and αi < 0.5 implies risk averse behaviour, i.e.
cei(X)< E(X). (5.3)
I will occasionally refer to the level of risk aversion, which is higher with
lower αi2. Note that αi > 0.5, i.e. risk loving behaviour, is excluded, for
reasons that will become apparent later in the chapter.
To determine emissions and value for each possible coalition S⊆ N, I follow
the original CT model. Let j /∈ S. Then player j maximizes (the certainty
equivalent of) its individual utility:
max
E j
ce j(U j(E j,EN)). (5.4)
All players i ∈ S maximize the sum of (the certainty equivalent of) the util-
ity of all members:
max
(Ei)i∈S
∑
i∈S
cei(Ui(Ei,EN)). (5.5)
These parallel optimizations provide deterministic emission levels for all
players. The value function V (S) provides the payoffs for each coalition
1 This will be the case throughout the chapter.
2 The level of risk aversion as used in this chapter should not be confused with the degree of
risk aversion, which is defined as the ratio of second and first derivative of an agent’s utility
function (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965).
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S ⊆ N. It is given by the sum of the utility of all members of the coalition,
and is therefore a stochastic variable:
V (S) =∑
i∈S
Ui(Ei,EN). (5.6)
5.1.1 Allocation concepts
In order to check whether a stable global agreement is possible, I continue to
use core stability. For the deterministic case, the core contains all allocations
of the value of the grand coalition N, such that no coalition can achieve a
higher payoff by defecting from the grand coalition. This requires the def-
inition of the concept of an allocation. For games with stochastic payoffs,
two different concepts of an allocation exist: the concept of pure payoff al-
location by Timmer et al. (2005) and the concept of expectation and risk
allocation by Suijs et al. (1999).
The concept of pure payoff allocation defines an allocation of V (S) as a vec-
tor of multiples of V (S) (Timmer et al., 2005). Let h ∈R|S| with ∑i∈S hi = 1.
Then player i ∈ S receives hiV (S).
In the concept of expectation and risk allocation (Suijs et al., 1999), an allo-
cation is defined by two vectors, one for the expected value of the stochastic
payoff, and one for the risk. Let (d,r) ∈ R|S|×R|S|+ with
∑
i∈S
di = E(V (S)), (5.7a)
∑
i∈S
ri = 1. (5.7b)
Then player i ∈ S receives
di+ ri(V (S)−E(V (S))). (5.8)
The pure payoff allocation concept is a direct translation from the determinis-
tic allocation concept, as every player receives a share of the coalition value.
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However, as the coalition value is now stochastic, this means that a player
can only receive a payoff if she also takes on risk. For risk averse players,
the certainty equivalent of the received payoff is reduced by this presence of
risk. The expectation and risk allocation concept remedies this drawback by
allowing for an independent allocation of the expected value and the risk of
the stochastic payoff. As a consequence, it is possible for very risk averse
players to offload (some of) their risk on to less risk averse players, improv-
ing (the certainty equivalent of) total utility. On the other hand, risk neutral
players can “insure” other players against risk by taking it on themselves,
and receive some compensation for this service.
For both allocation concepts, an allocation X of V (N) is in the core of the
game, if for no coalition S⊂N there exists an allocation Y of V (S), such that
Yi  Xi for all players i∈ S. In other words, all members of a coalition S need
to agree on a deviation from the grand coalition N.
For the concept of pure payoff allocation, several convexity concepts exist,
which all imply that the core of the game is not empty (Timmer et al., 2005).
For the concept of expectation and risk allocation, the core of the game is
not empty if and only if (Suijs et al., 1999)
max
i∈N
qαi(V (N))≥ ∑
S⊂N
δS max
i∈S
qαi(V (S)), (5.9)
where δS is a balanced map, i.e.
∑
S⊂N
δS1i∈S = 1 ∀i ∈ N. (5.10)
In the following sections, I will apply both allocation concepts to stochastic
models of climate cooperation. Section 5.2 considers technological uncer-
tainty, while Section 5.3 considers uncertainty in climate damages.
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5.2 Technological uncertainty
This section considers uncertainty in mitigation costs, i.e. in the consumption
function. For the mean µ , I use a quadratic function in emission reductions.
Uncertainty increases with emission reductions, as more new technologies
need to be applied. The distribution is set, such that the standard deviation, σ ,
increases quadratically with emission reductions, in line with the determinis-
tic mitigation costs. A normal distribution is used. Specifically, the model is
Ci(Ei)∼N
C0i − γi(E0i −Ei)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ
,(θ(E0i −Ei)2)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ2
 , (5.11)
with
• C0i : baseline consumption level
• E0i : baseline emission level
• γi: mitigation cost parameter
• θ : amount of uncertainty parameter
• µ: mean of normal distribution
• σ2: variance of normal distribution
For α ≤ 0.5, this formulation ensures that, in terms of consumption, a higher
emission level is preferred to a lower emission level, i.e. emission reduc-
tions are costly3.
Damages from climate change are assumed to be known with certainty in this
section. They increase quadratically with global emissions EN = ∑ni=1 Ei:
Di(EN) = piiE2N , (5.12)
3 For α > 0.5, this would not necessarily be the case, as the higher risk resulting from emission
reductions is preferred to lower risk. Therefore, this case is excluded throughout the chapter.
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where pii is the damage cost parameter. The use of quadratic functions for
both consumption and damages follows the literature (e.g. Diamantoudi
and Sartzetakis, 2006; Eichner and Pethig, 2015) and ensures that no
country or coalition has a dominant strategy4, while the game remains
analytically solvable.
Taking consumption and damage together, utility is given by
Ui(Ei,EN) =Ci(Ei)−Di(EN)
∼N (C0i − γi(E0i −Ei)2−piiE2N ,(θ(E0i −Ei)2)2) . (5.13)
As utility is normally distributed, the certainty equivalent of utility is
cei(Ui(Ei,EN)) = µ+σz(αi)
=C0i − γi(E0i −Ei)2−piiE2N +θ(E0i −Ei)2z(αi), (5.14)
where z(αi) is the probit function
z(αi) =
√
2 er f−1(2αi−1), (5.15)
er f (x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt. (5.16)
er f (x) is the so-called error function. z(αi) is strictly increasing and
z(0.5) = 0. Consequently, z(αi) ≤ 0 for the range of αi considered in
this chapter.
Players determine their emission levels by optimizing the certainty equiv-
alent of utility. Proposition 1 shows the resulting emission levels and the
impact of uncertainty.
Proposition 1. Let S⊂ N. For the game with technological uncertainty,
4 In games with linear damage functions, a country’s optimal level of emissions is independent
of the level of emissions of the other players. Therefore, this optimal level of emissions is a
dominant strategy.
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(i) emission levels of individual players (Ei(S)) and global emissions
(EN(S)) are given by
EN(S) =
E0N
piS∑i∈S 1γi−θz(αi) +∑ j/∈S
pi j
γ j−θz(α j) +1
, (5.17a)
Ei(S) = E0i −
piS
γi−θz(αi)EN(S) ∀i ∈ S, (5.17b)
E j(S) = E0j −
pi j
γ j−θz(α j)EN(S) ∀ j /∈ S, (5.17c)
with piS = ∑i∈S pii.
(ii) increases in the amount of uncertainty (θ ) or in the level of risk
aversion (−z(α)) influence emission levels like an increase of the
mitigation cost (γ).
(iii) increases in the amount of uncertainty (θ ) or in the level of risk aver-
sion (−z(α)) lead to higher emission levels.
For reasons of readability, all theoretical proofs can be found in
Appendix C.1.
Proposition 1 (ii) and (iii) follow intuitively from the fact that all players are
risk averse or risk neutral. As emission reductions cause higher uncertainty,
an additional “cost” of mitigation is created. This cost is treated similarly
to the deterministic mitigation cost γ . As the damage function is unchanged
compared to the deterministic case, the benefit from emission reductions is
also unchanged. Consequently, the optimal emission levels under technolog-
ical uncertainty are higher than without uncertainty.
5.2.1 Stability of global cooperation under
pure payoff allocation
I now consider the stability of global cooperation in the game with techno-
logical uncertainty. Specifically, I check whether the core of the cooperative
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game with stochastic payoffs is non-empty for all cases, as in the determinis-
tic case. First, I consider the game under pure payoff allocation. Proposition
2 shows that the result from the deterministic case cannot be transferred to
the uncertain setup.
Proposition 2. Under pure payoff allocation, the core of the cooperative
game with stochastic payoffs and technological uncertainty can be empty.
The proof is given by the following simple counter-example.
Example 1. Let N = {1, ..,4} and
α =

0.001
0.1
0.5
0.5

, γ = pi = E0 =

1
1
1
1

, C0 =

10
10
10
10

. (5.18)
The resulting game is given in Table C.2 in Appendix C.2.
The four players in Example 1 only differ in their risk preferences. Player
1 is very risk averse, player 2 is modestly risk averse, while players 3 and
4 are risk neutral. As a result of their different levels of risk aversion, the
certainty equivalent of a payoff differs between the players. Figure 5.1 shows
the relation between the share of V (N) a player receives and the respective
certainty equivalent of the payoff, for all players.
A high share of V (N) increases the payoff in expectation, but also increases
the level of risk. We see that player 1 actually prefers a payoff of zero to a
small share of V (N), due to its high level of risk aversion. For a share larger
than roughly 0.05, the increase in expectation has the larger effect and player
1 prefers the higher share. Still, the larger risk for higher shares of V (N)
causes the certainty equivalent of the payoff to increase at the smallest rate
of all players. Player 2 experiences the same phenomenon, but the impact
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Figure 5.1: Certainty equivalent of payoff for varying share of V (N), for all players in Exam-
ple 1.
of risk is much smaller. For players 3 and 4, who are risk neutral, only the
expected value of their share of V (N) matters, and consequently the certainty
equivalent of their payoff increases linearly with the share of V (N).
To now show that the core of this game is empty, I compare the payoff of the
grand coalition N to the payoffs of all singleton coalitions {i}. Specifically, I
determine the minimum share of V (N) each player needs to equal its payoff
in the singleton case. For example, player 1 compares its payoff to the payoff
of singleton coalition {1}. The corresponding certainty equivalent is 8.5319.
In Figure 5.1, one can see that player 1 would need a share of 0.3857 of V (N)
or higher to prefer a proposed global allocation to the singleton payoff.
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This calculation can be done for all players. The certainty equivalent of the
singleton payoffs and the resulting minimum shares of V (N) are shown in
Table 5.1.
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
Singleton payoff 8.5319 8.3033 7.6406 7.6406
Minimum share 0.3857 0.2865 0.2162 0.2162
Table 5.1: Singleton payoffs and minimum shares of V (N) to satisfy corresponding singleton
coalition for all players in Example 1.
The sum of the minimum shares of all players is 1.1046. As this is larger than
one, no global allocation can satisfy all singleton coalitions simultaneously.
Therefore, the core of the game is empty. The result is driven by the risk
averse players 1 and 2. For them to join the grand coalition, both need a share
of V (N) substantially larger than 0.25 to compensate for the technological
uncertainty associated with reaching low emission levels. While the risk
neutral players 3 and 4 would be content with less than a uniform allocation,
they cannot lower their share enough to allow sufficient redistribution to the
risk averse players.
The result is also driven by the heterogeneity of risk aversion between the
four players. If all players were as risk averse as player 1, the emission level
in the grand coalition would remain higher, reducing technological uncer-
tainty. Consequently, each player would be content with a share of V (N) of
0.25 and the core of the game would not be empty. Similarly, if all players
were risk neutral, the game would be similar to the deterministic case and
therefore the core would not be empty. Overall, the combination of very risk
averse players with risk neutral players causes the emptiness of the core in
Example 1, as the wishes of both groups of players cannot be sufficiently
reconciled in the grand coalition.
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5.2.2 Stability of global cooperation under
expectation and risk allocation
The previous section showed that under pure payoff allocation, the core of
the game can be empty. This is caused by the inability for very risk averse
players to receive an appropriate payoff without also taking on risk. The
expectation and risk allocation concept in this section allows independent
allocation of expectation and risk. This reinstates the result of core non-
emptiness from the deterministic case. For the analytical proof, two simpli-
fying assumptions are needed.
Assumption 1. (i) All players are symmetric in all parameters except αi,
the level of risk aversion.
(ii) At least one player is risk-neutral, i.e. αi = 0.5.
Proposition 3. Under expectation and risk allocation and Assumption 1,
the core of the cooperative game with stochastic payoffs and technological
uncertainty is non-empty.
Numerical simulations suggest that Proposition 3 also holds when Assump-
tion 1 is not fulfilled. No counter-example was found.
Intuitively, Proposition 3 is a direct result from the possibility of independent
risk allocation. This allows the least risk averse player to take on all risk in
the grand coalition. If this player is risk neutral, the game is similar to the
deterministic case and the deterministic core allocation is also in the core of
the stochastic game. If the least risk averse player is not risk neutral, the
acceptance of risk by this player in the grand coalition still creates a total
utility surplus, compared to smaller coalitions. Most of this utility surplus
can then be allocated to the least risk averse player as compensation for the
acceptance of risk, so that this player also agrees to global cooperation. As
the other players are made better off by being allowed to offload risk, this
mechanism allows for a core stable allocation.
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5.3 Uncertainty in climate damages
This section considers uncertainty in the damage function. In a reversal of the
setup in the last section, the consumption function is known with certainty,
Ci(Ei) =C0i − γi(E0i −Ei)2, (5.19)
while the damage function is normally distributed
Di(EN)∼N
(
piiE2N ,(κiE
2
N)
2) , (5.20)
with parameter κi for the amount of uncertainty. Similar to the last section,
αi ≤ 0.5 ensures that, when considering damages, a lower global emission
level is preferred to a higher global emission level, i.e. emission reductions
reduce climate damages.
Utility is given by
Ui(Ei,EN) = Pi(Ei)−Di(EN)
∼N (P0i − γi(E0i −Ei)2−piiE2N ,(κiE2N)2) (5.21)
with certainty equivalent
cei(Ui(Ei,EN)) =C0i − γi(E0i −Ei)2−piiE2N +κiE2Nz(αi). (5.22)
Proposition 4 shows the emission levels resulting from the optimization of
the certainty equivalents of utility and the effect of uncertainty.
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Proposition 4. Let S⊂N. For the game with uncertainty in climate damages,
(i) emission levels of individual players and global emissions are given by
EN(S) =
E0N
(piS− (κz(α))S)∑i∈S 1γi +∑ j/∈S
pi j−κ jz(α j)
γ j +1
, (5.23a)
Ei(S) = E0i −
piS− (κz(α))S
γi
EN(S), ∀i ∈ S (5.23b)
E j(S) = E0j −
pi j−κ jz(α j)
γ j
EN(S) ∀ j /∈ S, (5.23c)
with piS = ∑i∈S pii and (κz(α))S = ∑i∈S κiz(αi).
(ii) increases in the amount of uncertainty (κ) or in the level of risk
aversion (−z(α)) influence emission levels like an increase of the
damage cost (pi).
(iii) increases in the amount of uncertainty (κ) or in the level of risk aver-
sion (−z(α)) lead to lower emission levels.
Similar to Section 5.2, Proposition 4 (ii) and (iii) follow directly from the
risk aversion of the players. As uncertainty is tied to the global emission
level, emission reductions reduce uncertainty in this setup. Therefore, an
extra benefit of mitigation is created by the inclusion of uncertainty, which is
added to the deterministic benefit of mitigation, pi . Consequently, emission
levels are lower than without uncertainty.
5.3.1 Stability of global cooperation under
pure payoff allocation
Again, I first consider the (non-)emptiness of the core of the cooperative
game with stochastic payoffs under pure payoff allocation. In contrast to the
game with technological uncertainty, global cooperation in the game with
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uncertainty in climate damages reduces total risk compared to the singletons
case, as global emission levels are lowest under global cooperation. This
can be seen in the standard deviation (σ ), which increases quadratically with
global emissions. Therefore, the impossibility of risk redistribution under
the pure payoff allocation concept is not as detrimental to stable global co-
operation as under technological uncertainty, because less risk needs to be
redistributed. Consequently, the core of the game is non-empty for simple
games similar to Example 1. However, games with empty core still exist,
as Proposition 5 shows.
Proposition 5. Under pure payoff allocation, the core of the cooperative
game with stochastic payoffs and uncertainty in climate damages can
be empty.
The proof is given by the following counter-example.
Example 2. Let N = {1,2,3} and
α =

0.001
0.1
0.5
 , κ =

0.01
0.1
0.5
 , γ =

1
1
1
 , pi =

0.1
0.01
0.001

C0 = 104

1
5
5
 , E0 = 102

1
1
1
 . (5.24)
The resulting game is given in Table C.3 in Appendix C.2.
The three players in Example 2 differ in their risk preferences, with player
1 being very risk averse, player 2 being modestly risk averse and player 3
being risk neutral. They also differ in their personal amount of risk (κ) and
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in the deterministic damage cost (pi). Player 1 is very risk averse, but expe-
riences relatively little risk, while having the highest deterministic damage
cost. Player 2’s amount of risk and deterministic damage cost are both mod-
estly high, similar to the level of risk aversion. Player 3 is risk neutral, while
his amount of risk is the highest of all players and the deterministic damage
cost is the lowest. Figure 5.2 again shows the relation between the share of
V (N) a player receives and the payoff.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
x 104
share of V(N)
ce
(s 
V(
N)
)
 
 
Player 1
Player 2
Player 3
Figure 5.2: Certainty equivalent of payoff for varying share of V (N), for all players in Exam-
ple 2.
The picture is similar to the technological uncertainty case. Player 1 needs a
share of V (N) of roughly 0.2 or larger in order prefer the payoff to zero, due
to the detrimental impact of risk. Player 2 experiences the same mechanism,
but the effect is much smaller, while for player 3 the payoff increases linearly
with the share of V (N).
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Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
Singleton payoff 0.17E+04 4.12E+04 4.99E+04
Minimum share 0.2170 0.5390 0.4948
Table 5.2: Singleton payoffs and minimum shares of V (N) to satisfy corresponding singleton
coalition for all players in Example 2.
For the determination of core emptiness, the minimum shares of V (N) to
satisfy the singleton coalition of each player can be calculated, similar to
Example 1. The results are shown in Table 5.2 and the sum of all minimum
shares is 1.2508. Consequently, the core of the game is empty. In contrast
to Example 1, the result is not driven by the most risk averse player, who
actually requires less than a uniform allocation share, as the singleton payoff
is relatively low. This is due to the low baseline consumption level C0, which
for player 1 is substantially lower than for players 2 and 3. A high share of
V (N) is rather required by player 2, because the modest level of risk aversion
still means that the payoff growth in Figure 5.2 is substantially less than for
the risk neutral player 3. Further, the singleton payoff of player 2 is relatively
high, because the baseline consumption level is among the highest of all
players. Consequently, a very high share of V (N) is needed to compensate
player 2 for the effect of risk.
Again, heterogeneity between the players is required for the result of core
emptiness. If the players were symmetric in all parameters, the chosen emis-
sion level in the grand coalition, and its associated level of risk, would con-
form with the wishes of all players equally. Then, a uniform allocation of
V (N) to all players would be stable and the core of the game would not be
empty. Asymmetry in the parameters can concentrate the detrimental effects
of risk on one or a few players and thereby cause an empty core.
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5.3.2 Stability of global cooperation under
expectation and risk allocation
Finally, I check whether the expectation and risk allocation concept reinstates
the result of core non-emptiness from the deterministic case, as it did under
technological uncertainty. This is indeed the case, as Proposition 6 shows.
Proposition 6. Under expectation and risk allocation, the core of the co-
operative game with stochastic payoffs and uncertainty in climate damages
is non-empty.
The intuitive reasoning behind the result is similar to the technological uncer-
tainty setup, as the independence of risk allocation allows the least risk averse
player to take on all risk in the grand coalition. This creates a total utility
surplus, which can be used to compensate the least risk averse player for the
acceptance of risk, making all players better off under global cooperation.
5.4 Discussion
This section situates the theoretical results in the general context of inter-
national climate policy. Uncertainty continues to play a large role in the
climate policy discourse, as the economic effects of climate change are still
quite uncertain and many current estimates do not account for some factors
likely to influence the impact of climate change, such as changing weather
patterns or tipping points (Burke et al., 2015; IPCC, 2014a). Further, the fu-
ture development of low-carbon technologies, and their costs, remain highly
uncertain. For example, carbon capture and storage usually plays a promi-
nent role in long-term scenarios compatible with ambitious emission reduc-
tion targets, but faces several technical, economic and political uncertainties
(Watson et al., 2014; Koelbl et al., 2014). On the other hand, some low-
carbon technologies have surprised with rapid cost reductions, such as the
80% drop in the costs of photovoltaic modules in mature markets between
2008 and 2012 (International Energy Agency, 2014a).
101
5 Stability of global climate cooperation under uncertainty
In this context, the results of this chapter lend themselves to two conclu-
sions. First, the results suggest that global emission levels react differently
to technological uncertainty and uncertainty in climate damages, in a situa-
tion with risk averse actors. While technological uncertainty introduces an
additional mitigation cost, the presence of uncertainty in climate damages
introduces an additional mitigation benefit. Consequently, global emission
levels are higher under technological uncertainty, and lower under uncer-
tainty in climate damages, compared to the situation without uncertainty.
This suggests that research on low-carbon technologies, reducing mitigation
costs and technological uncertainty, could be particularly effective in lower-
ing global GHG emissions. On the other hand, some amount of uncertainty
in climate damages helps to reduce emission levels, as risk averse actors re-
act to uncertainty by increasing their mitigation efforts. While this result is
also supported by the analysis of Bramoullé and Treich (2009), based on in-
ternal and external stability, Benchekroun and van Long (2013) find that it no
longer holds up in a dynamic game with a stock pollutant. Further, in the ac-
tual climate policy discourse, uncertainty about the effects of climate change
is often used to justify a delay of mitigation efforts, notably by US President
George W. Bush in his announcement that he would not support the Kyoto
Protocol (White House, 2001). Supporters of the precautionary principle, on
the other hand, argue that high climate uncertainty should compel ambitious
mitigation efforts (e.g. Grant and Quiggin, 2014; Lewandowsky et al., 2014).
Second, the results on core stability in this chapter suggest that the ability
of risk redistribution between countries is a key determinant for stability of
a global climate agreement. For both technological uncertainty and uncer-
tainty in climate damages, global cooperation can be unstable under pure
payoff allocation, where risk cannot be detached from the payoff. However,
if the expectation and risk allocation concept is used, where risk can be freely
distributed, a stable global agreement always exists.
This suggests that risk redistribution should be incorporated in the interna-
tional climate regime. In particular, stable cooperation might be aided by the
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willingness of some countries to shoulder some of the risk of other countries,
in addition to their own. Arguably, developed countries are better equipped
to deal with with unexpected events than developing countries, due to higher
wealth and well established governmental structures. Therefore, developed
countries could shoulder additional risk, in exchange for more ambitious
emission reductions from developing countries. This would both reduce the
global impact of climate uncertainty and harmonize international emission
reduction efforts.
The redistribution of risk might be achieved via the Warsaw International
Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM) (e.g. UNFCCC, 2013), which was
established at COP19 in 2013 and intends to address climate loss and damage
in developing countries. The importance of loss and damage was further
recognized in the Paris Agreement, which includes an independent article
devoted to the subject (UNFCCC, 2015a, art. 8). While the WIM currently
focuses on knowledge and dialogue, it was requested at COP21 “to establish
a clearing house for risk transfer” (UNFCCC, 2015b, para. 48). The mandate
of the WIM could further be enhanced at a scheduled review at COP22.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter integrates technological uncertainty and uncertainty in climate
damages into the model of international climate negotiations using core sta-
bility, by Chander and Tulkens (1997). This requires adjustments of several
concepts of cooperative game theory, most prominently the concept of an
allocation, for which two distinct concepts are put forward in the literature.
I find that the deterministic result of core non-emptiness does not necessar-
ily carry over to the uncertain setup, if the pure payoff allocation concept
is used. However, the expectation and risk allocation concept reinstates the
deterministic result, by allowing independent allocations of expected value
of a payoff and of its risk. The possibility of risk redistribution, for example
through the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage, might
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therefore improve the opportunity for global agreement in the international
climate negotiations.
The model in this chapter could be extended or modified in a few ways. First,
the shape of the consumption and the damage functions could be generalized
or changed. Second, other probability distributions and preference orderings
could be used. Third, technological uncertainty and uncertainty under cli-
mate damages could both be considered in a joint model, or other types of
uncertainty could be introduced.
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The previous chapters introduced several real-world properties into the CT
model to enhance its level of realism and to better align it with the absence
of a global agreement on country-level emission targets found under the cur-
rent international climate regime. This chapter analyses a potential alterna-
tive to the current structure of international climate negotiations, so-called
climate clubs.
The idea of moving the climate negotiations from the UNFCCC to other,
non-global fora has been suggested by several scholars (see e.g. Bodansky,
2002; Asheim et al., 2006; Naím, 2009; Victor, 2009; Eckersley, 2012; Weis-
cher et al., 2012; Grasso and Roberts, 2014; Hovi et al., 2016). The literature
suggests that advantages of climate clubs over global negotiations might be
faster negotiations, higher ambition from the club members, better partici-
pation from private actors and more equitable agreements (Biermann et al.,
2009). Simple game-theoretic models indeed imply that negotiations in small
groups can aid the coordination between countries, and that global negotia-
tions can be supported by prior agreements of a few countries (Smead et al.,
2014). An analysis of UNFCCC high-level segment speeches suggests that
climate clubs could reduce negotiation complexity by eliminating secondary
demands from country positions (Bagozzi, 2014). Most climate clubs try to
ensure that they act complementary to the UNFCCC (Widerberg and Pat-
tberg, 2015).
However, from an empirical perspective, not enough is known about the ef-
fectiveness of different forms of climate governance to evaluate the proposed
advantages of climate clubs (Jordan et al., 2015). Biermann et al. (2009)
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point out several problems of climate clubs, such as “forum shopping” by
powerful states and the potential for a “race to the bottom” between compet-
ing clubs. Biermann et al. (2009) conclude that fragmentation of the global
climate governance might do more harm than good.
The number of climate clubs has increased substantially since 2005, as ne-
gotiations on a global agreement began under the UNFCCC (Weischer et al.,
2012). Many of these clubs focus on specific issues, such as the promotion
of renewable energy or energy efficiency, or the reduction of deforestation
or short-lived greenhouse gases (Widerberg and Stenson, 2013). In a survey
of climate negotiation participants (Hjerpe and Nasiritousi, 2015), the two
most frequently mentioned clubs were state clubs: the Major Economies Fo-
rum On Energy And Climate (MEF), which brings together the 17 largest
economies of the world, and the Group of Twenty (G20). The topic of cli-
mate change was featured in the final declaration of all G20 leaders’ summits
since the introduction of regular summits in 20081.
Some studies have used internal and external stability to analyse coopera-
tion among smaller country groups. For exclusive membership games, Finus
et al. (2005) find that exclusive membership stabilizes some coalitions, com-
pared with open membership. However, these coalitions only marginally im-
prove emission reductions over the the case of no cooperation. Asheim et al.
(2006) examine two parallel regional agreements and find that the two agree-
ments are able to improve participation over a single agreement. Nordhaus
(2015) studies clubs with penalty tariffs on non-participants. He finds that
the penalty greatly enhances participation in the club and that this structure
makes emission reductions near the global optimal level possible. However,
such a penalty might not be compatible with the rules of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) (see Jaspers and Falkner, 2013, for an overview of the
literature on the compatibility of climate policy with WTO rules).
1 See Shaw (2011) for an overview of G20 decisions on climate change.
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In all of these studies, the participation of countries in a coalition evolves
during the course of the game, that is the membership of the climate club
changes. However, some of the clubs that are discussed as potential fora for
a climate agreement have a fixed set of members and exist independently
of the climate issue. The best example is given by the G20, which is often
cited as a potential climate club (Naím, 2009; Hjerpe and Nasiritousi, 2015).
It was founded as a forum for international economic cooperation and its
membership has not changed since its inception. Consequently, participation
in such a club is not the result of a game of climate cooperation, as previous
studies assert. Rather, the club and its members are given, and the question
becomes whether stable climate cooperation in the club is possible. The
analysis of this question requires a different framework, which accounts for
a given club with fixed membership.
In this chapter, I analyse the stability of climate cooperation in pre-existing
state clubs with fixed membership, such as the G20. Countries are divided
into two distinct groups: those who are supposed to come to an agreement on
legally binding commitments for all countries in this group (the club mem-
bers) and the remaining countries, who benefit from commitments made by
the club members, but do not commit to emission reductions themselves
(the outsiders).
As decision making in state clubs like the G20 requires approval of all mem-
bers, an agreement would have to include all club members. Therefore, I
analyse the existence of a stable agreement using the core stability concept
by Chander and Tulkens (1997), which incorporates such a unanimity rule.
So far, this concept has only been used to study global cooperation. I mod-
ify the model of global cooperation for the study of cooperation among state
clubs, using the concept of a subgame. While this concept has been used to
study several types of cooperative games2, it has so far not been employed
2 The subgame concept was introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1969) to study market games.
Inter alia, it has also been used to study partition, packing and covering games (Deng et al.,
2000; Bietenhader and Okamoto, 2006)
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in the context of the game of climate cooperation. I provide an analytical
solution to the game with quadratic functions and determine the set of pa-
rameters for which a stable agreement among club members exists. I first
assume that countries inside the club and countries outside the club are sym-
metric among their respective group. This assumption is later dropped and
the impact of heterogeneous countries on the stability of a club agreement is
shown. Finally, I apply the model to the case of the G20, using mitigation
cost estimates from a techno-economic model and damage cost estimates
from an integrated assessment model.
The model is presented in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 gives theoretical results
for the symmetric and the asymmetric case. Section 6.3 shows the applica-
tion of the model to the case of the G20. Section 6.4 concludes and gives
an outlook for future work.
6.1 The model
The setup is again based on the original CT model, without any of the modi-
fications described in the previous chapters. I model negotiations of climate
clubs as a subgame3 of the cooperative game in the CT model. The following
definition is due to Peleg and Sudhölter (2007).
Definition 1. Let (N,v) be a game. A subgame of (N,v) is a game (T,vT )
where /0 6= T ⊆ N and vT (S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T . The subgame (T,vT ) is
also denoted by (T,v).
Let T ⊂N be the set of club members and let R=N\T contain the outsiders.
Then, the subgame (T,v) assesses the existence of a stable agreement among
club members, while outsiders behave as they would in the global game. In
accordance with the behaviour outlined above, outsiders maximize individ-
ual utility, while their payoff depends, inter alia, on the level of emissions
3 Note that the subgame concept used in this chapter is different from the concept of a subgame
of a non-cooperative game in extensive form. Therefore, it also bears no relation to the notion
of a “subgame-perfect equilibrium”.
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of T . Therefore, R benefits from cooperation in T . However, decreasing
emissions from T lead to increasing emissions from members of R, as they
re-optimize their individual utility, making cooperation among T less bene-
ficial and potentially unstable.
The existence of a stable agreement among the club members is tested by
computing the utility of each subcoalition S⊂ T , and comparing it to the util-
ity of the club coalition T . This comparison determines the (non-)emptiness
of the core of the subgame, which is the focus of the theoretical examination
in the next section.
6.2 Theoretical results
For the theoretical analysis, I use quadratic consumption and damage func-
tions, as introduced in Chapter 5. We will see that the (non-)emptiness of the
core of the subgame crucially depends on the parameters for emission miti-
gation costs and for damages caused by emissions, γ and pi . The setup is
Ci(Ei) =
C0i − γi(E0i −Ei)2, Ei < E0iC0i , Ei ≥ E0i ∀i ∈ N (6.1a)
Di(EN) = piiE2N ∀i ∈ N, (6.1b)
with
• C0i : baseline consumption level
• E0i : baseline emission level
• γi: mitigation cost parameter
• pii: damage cost parameter
• EN = ∑ni=1 Ei: global emissions
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For convenience, define s := |S| and t := |T |. The theoretical analysis begins
by assuming symmetry of countries inside each of the two groups (T and
R). This allows for the computation of conditions for the non-emptiness of
the core of the subgame. In a second step, I allow individual parameters for
countries inside a group and show how the core of the game changes with
the introduction of heterogeneity.
6.2.1 Symmetric countries
In this section, I assume symmetry of countries inside each group, meaning
that the parameters of all countries inside a group are equal:
γl = γi, pil = pii, C0l =C
0
i ∀i, l ∈ T, (6.2a)
γl = γ j, pil = pi j, C0l =C
0
j ∀ j, l ∈ R. (6.2b)
For clarity, the index i represents a country in T , j represents a country in R,
with l being an arbitrary third country. In order to determine conditions for
the non-emptiness of the core, I first consider the symmetric allocation and
later show that no other allocation needs to be considered.
Lemma 1. Let
y ∈ Rt , yi ≡ v(T )t (6.3)
be the symmetric allocation of the subgame (T,v).
(i) In the setup above, the symmetric allocation lies in the core if and
only if
a(γi,γ j,pii,pi j,s, t,n)≤ 0 ∀s = 1, .., t−1, (6.4)
110
6.2 Theoretical results
where
a(γi,γ j,pii,pi j,s, t,n)
=
[
t+ s
t2 piiγi +1
(n− t)2
(
pi j
γ j
)2
+2(n− t)pi j
γ j
(6.5)
+(2− s− t)(s2 pii
γi
+1)+(t− s)pii
γi
]
(t− s)piiγi
s2 piiγi +1
.
(ii) a(γi,γ j,pii,pi j,s, t,n) is monotonically increasing in
pi j
γ j .
For reasons of readability, all proofs can be found in Appendix D.1.
As a only depends on the fractions piiγi and
pi j
γ j , set γi = γ j = 1 without loss of
generality and write a(pii,pi j,s, t,n) := a(1,1,pii,pi j,s, t,n).
For a set game (i.e. n and t fixed), one can calculate the combinations of pii
and pi j for which the symmetric allocation lies in the core. Let
Ps = {(pii,pi j) ∈ R2+ | a(pii,pi j,s, t,n)≤ 0}. (6.6)
Then
P =
t−1⋂
s=1
Ps (6.7)
is this set. We will later see that it is the set of parameter combinations that
lead to a non-empty core.
Let s, t and n be fixed. As a(pii,pi j,s, t,n) is continuous for pii,pi j > 0, the
boundary betweenPs and R2+\Ps can be identified. It corresponds to
a(pii,pi j,s, t,n) = 0
and, as Lemma 2 (i) shows, it can be interpreted as a function p¯i j(pii,s, t,n).
Some useful features of this function are shown in Lemma 2 (ii).
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Lemma 2. (i) The function p¯i j(pii,s, t,n) is well defined by
a(pii, p¯i j(pii,s, t,n),s, t,n) = 0, pii > 0, p¯i j(pii,s, t,n)> 0.
(ii) p¯i j(pii,s, t,n) is monotonically increasing in pii and s.
As a(pii,pi j,s, t,n) is monotonically increasing in pi j, all parameter combina-
tions (pii,pi j) with pi j > p¯i j(pii,s, t,n) do not satisfy condition (6.4). For the
symmetric allocation to be in the core, this condition has to be satisfied for
all s. Together with the fact that p¯i j(pii,s, t,n) is monotonically increasing in
s, we get the result that s = 1 is the only relevant case. In addition, no other
allocations have to be considered, as Proposition 7 shows.
Proposition 7.
P =P1 (6.8)
is the set of parameters that lead to a non-empty core of the game.
I now consider the effect of a change in the parameters pii and pi j on the sta-
bility of cooperation of the club. This is best done by first visualizing the
set P . Figure 6.1 shows P (blue area) for a game with 3 club members
and 2 outsiders.
From the fact that a(pii,pi j,s, t,n) is monotonically increasing in pi j, we get
the, somewhat counterintuitive, result that a higher damage cost parame-
ter of the outsiders R (and thus lower emission levels in the uncooperative
equilibrium) leads to less potential cooperation4 among the club members
T . In contrast, as p¯i j(pii,s, t,n) is increasing in pii, higher damages within
the club lead to more potential cooperation. The reason lies in the leakage
effect. Higher damages in R lead to a steeper slope of the best-reply function
for countries in R5. This means that countries in R react more strongly to
cooperation in T (and the accompanying emission reductions) by increasing
4 By "less (more) potential cooperation", I simply mean the fact that, with increasing parameter,
the game reaches a point at which the core becomes (non-)empty.
5 See proof to Lemma 1.
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emissions themselves. The result is less potential cooperation in T . Increases
in pii do not influence the best-reply function of countries in R and therefore
do not cause a stronger leakage effect. Consequently, a different effect deter-
mines the result of an increase in pii: the gains of cooperation for members
of T grow and hence lead to games with a non-empty core. These effects
are similar to the behaviour of stable coalition size in models based on the
internal and external stability concept.
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Figure 6.1: The blue area representsP for t = 3,n = 5.
Taken together, the results imply that it is especially important to involve
those countries with high climate damages and/or low mitigation costs in
the club attempting to negotiate a climate agreement, as it enhances the
parameter space leading to the existence of a stable agreement. While it
is in the self-interest of countries with high climate damages to participate
in those negotiations, countries with low mitigation costs might need to be
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motivated externally, for example by the prospect of transfer payments for
emission reductions.
Upper limit of pi j
The shape of P in Figure 6.1 suggests that the boundary value might con-
verge to a fixed value for large pii. Indeed, there exists such an absolute upper
limit p¯iulj , independent of pii. To show the existence of p¯iulj , consider the shape
of the boundary ofP and write p¯i j(pii, t,n) for p¯i j(pii,1, t,n). The following
Proposition states the main results about this function and its limits.
Proposition 8. Let p¯i j(pii, t,n) be defined by
a(pii, p¯i j(pii, t,n),1, t,n) = 0, pii > 0 and p¯i j > 0. (6.9)
Then
(i) p¯i j(pii, t,n) is well defined and
p¯i j(pii, t,n) =
t
(√
t2pi2i +(t2+1)pii+1− tpii
)
−1
(t+1)(n− t) . (6.10)
(ii)
lim
pii→0
p¯i j(pii, t,n) =
t−1
(t+1)(n− t) =: p¯i
ll
j (6.11)
(iii)
lim
pii→∞
p¯i j(pii, t,n) =
t−1
2(n− t) =: p¯i
ul
j (6.12)
(iv) p¯i llj and p¯iulj are monotonically increasing in t (for 2 ≤ t < n) and ap-
proach infinity as t→ n.
Proposition 8 (ii) and (iii) confirm the existence of upper and lower limits
of the boundary function. This means that if pi j > p¯iulj , the core of the game
is always empty, irrespective of pii. In other words, if damages from cli-
mate change are very high outside of the club, the club will not cooperate.
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In this case the main beneficiaries from emission reductions are not part of
the club and cooperation in the club would only be met by corresponding
emission increases outside of it, as outlined in the previous section. On the
other hand, the existence of the lower limit means that if pi j < p¯i llj , that is
damages outside of the club are very low, cooperation is always possible.
In this case, outsiders will not change their behaviour very much if the club
cooperates, as they are not heavily affected by climate change. Therefore,
the club comprises all relevant countries and the game of club cooperation
becomes “global”, in the sense that it includes all countries affected by cli-
mate change. As a result, the game is similar to the original CT model and
its result of a non-empty core.
Proposition 8 (iv) also shows that the results are consistent with the result of
the game of global cooperation. As the number of outsiders shrinks and the
number of club members approaches all players, the set of parameter combi-
nations that lead to a non-empty core expands towards the whole parameter
space. This means that, in the limit of club size, a stable agreement exists
for all parameter combinations.
6.2.2 Asymmetric countries
In this section, I drop the assumption of symmetry of countries and allow
for individual parameters for each country. This means that the model is
characterized by the number of countries n, the number of club members t
and the parameter vector
pi ∈ Rn+. (6.13)
I continue to assume γ ≡ 1. Proposition 9 shows results for global emissions
EN in the cases of no cooperation or full cooperation among club members,
when heterogeneity is present.
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Proposition 9. Let
piT := ∑
i∈T
pii, piR := ∑
j∈R
pi j.
and i ∈ T . Assume coalition S⊂ T forms. Then
EN =
E0N
piT +piR+1
if S = {i} (6.14)
and
EN =
E0N
tpiT +piR+1
if S = T. (6.15)
These instances represent the case of no cooperation (formation of
singleton coalitions) and the case of full cooperation among club
members, respectively.
Proposition 9 shows that global emissions do not depend on the individual
values of the damage parameter. Rather, they only depend on the parameter
sum of both groups. This means that individual parameters pii can be varied,
while holding piT and piR constant, without changing global emissions in the
cooperative case. I use this property to study the impact of heterogeneity on
the value of coalitions and therefore the existence of a stable allocation.
Due to the increased complexity of the case of asymmetric countries, con-
ditions for a non-empty core cannot easily be calculated. Instead, I draw
on Proposition 7 and focus on the set of singleton coalitions. Specifically,
I check whether
∑
i∈T
v({i})> v(T ), (6.16)
which is a sufficient condition for an emtpy core. The set of parameters for
which condition (6.16) is not satisfied is called P˜ . To be clear, this means
that, while pi /∈ P˜ is a sufficient condition for an empty core, pi ∈ P˜ is
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only a necessary condition for a non-empty core. However, Proposition 7
showed that
P˜ =P (6.17)
in the symmetric case. Similar to Lemma 1, the elements of P˜ are deter-
mined by a quadratic function in piR:
Lemma 3. Let pi ∈ Rn+. Then pi ∈ P˜ if and only if
a(pi) = ∑
i∈T
ai(pii,piT ,piR)≤ 0, (6.18)
where
ai(pii,piT ,piR) =
[
1
pi2i +pii
− 1
pi2T +pii
]
pi2R
+
[
piT +1
pi2i +pii
− tpiT +1
pi2T +pii
]
2piR (6.19)
+
(piT +1)2
pi2i +pii
− (tpiT +1)
2
pi2T +pii
.
By design, condition (6.18) is equivalent to condition (6.4) in the symmetric
case. Lemma 3 shows that heterogeneity of countries in R does not influence
membership in P˜ , as the condition only depends on piR, the sum of parame-
ters in R. The utility of club members is only influenced by the sum of emis-
sions of outsiders, not their distribution. As the sum of emissions of outsiders
does not depend on the distribution of parameters among outsider countries,
the cooperation decision is not influenced by this distribution. However, it is
clear that heterogeneity of countries in the club influences the core. Propo-
sition 10 investigates this influence.
Proposition 10. Let pi ∈ Rn+, l,h ∈ T with
pil ≤ piTt , pih ≥
piT
t
, (6.20)
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and let d > 0 with
d ≤ pil , d ≤ piT −pih. (6.21)
Define p˜i ∈ Rn+ by
p˜il = pil−d,
p˜ih = pih+d, (6.22)
p˜ii = pii ∀i 6= l, i 6= h.
Then a(p˜i)> a(pi).
p˜i is designed such that p˜iT = piT and p˜iR = piR, meaning that the transfor-
mation "adds" heterogeneity without altering the sum of parameters in each
group. The repeated application of Proposition 10 can construct any vector
with these total group values. Therefore, the specific definition of p˜i repre-
sents no loss of generality about the considered parameter vector.
Proposition 10 shows that the “addition” of heterogeneity in the club leads
to an increase in a(pi). The drivers behind this increase can be best visu-
alized with a numeric example. Building on Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2 shows
the impact of heterogeneity in the case of t = 3,n = 5. piT and piR are kept
constant, while one country’s share of piT is increased. The remaining part of
piT is divided equally between the other two club members. Focusing on the
total net value a(pi), we see that in the symmetric case (share of 13 ) we have
a(pi) < 0, meaning that a stable agreement exists. However, a(pi) increases
with heterogeneity between the countries in T and a(pi) is positive for shares
larger than 0.55, resulting in an empty core of the corresponding game.
This increase of a(pi) is driven by countries two and three, those with a de-
creasing share of piT . Note that a2(pi) = a3(pi) and a(pi) =∑3i=1 ai(pi). As the
ratio of damage cost and mitigation cost of countries two and three reduces,
the gains of cooperation become smaller and a2(pi) and a3(pi) rise. The op-
posite is true for country one: its ratio of damage cost and mitigation cost
increases, leading to higher gains of cooperation and lower a1(pi). However,
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this decrease is not big enough to offset the increases in a2(pi) and a3(pi).
Consequentially, a(pi) increases with heterogeneity.
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Figure 6.2: a(pi) for varying heterogeneity between club members. piT = 1, piR = 0.2, t = 3,
n = 5.
As the result of Proposition 10 holds for all piT and piR, the non-empty core
condition (6.18) is violated for some parameter combinations previously in
P˜ after the execution of transformation (6.22). Therefore, the set P˜ shrinks
with increased heterogeneity, as visualized in Figure 6.3. It shows P˜ for dif-
ferent distributions of piT upon the countries in T . These shares of countries
are varied between subfigures only, meaning
pˆii =
pii
piT
, i ∈ T (6.23)
is constant for each subfigure.
119
6 Cooperation of climate clubs
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Figure 6.3: P˜ for different levels of heterogeneity in T .
The shrinking of P˜ with increased heterogeneity causes a different shape of
the boundary of P˜ . While a high piR still leads to less cooperation in T (as
in the symmetric case), the same is true for a high piT , unlike the symmetric
case. An intuitive explanation for this phenomenon is that, for asymmetric
countries, the "absolute" differences in the parameters become more pro-
nounced with higher piT , which reinforces the effect that more heterogeneity
causes less cooperation. As the last subfigure shows, high diversity between
countries in T can even lead to a game for which the core is empty for all
combinations of piT and piR.
The results about cooperation of asymmetric countries align with the find-
ings of Driessen et al. (2011), who show that, in a cooperative oligopoly
game, higher heterogeneity of marginal costs decreases the size of the core.
This is also supported by the model of internal and external stability by Na
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and Shin (1998), who find that coalitions are more likely to form among sim-
ilar countries. However, Finus and Pintassilgo (2013) show that, in a more
general game with transfers, asymmetry can lead to larger stable agreements.
The latter view is also backed by Smead et al. (2014), who study a bargain-
ing game of equilibrium selection and find a positive impact of heterogeneity
between players on the chances of reaching an agreement.
6.3 Application of the model
to the Group of Twenty
The Group of Twenty (G20) is the most frequently mentioned forum for cli-
mate action outside of the UNFCCC in a survey of participants at UNFCCC
COPs (Hjerpe and Nasiritousi, 2015). It is also the biggest of the proposed
state clubs (Widerberg and Stenson, 2013) and climate change has been a
topic of discussion at all of its summits since 2008. Therefore, I use it for
an application of the theoretical model. The model could also be applied to
all other state clubs.
I start the analysis by estimating mitigation cost and damage cost parame-
ters, using the POLES and RICE models. Subsequently, this data is applied
to the theoretical model, beginning with the assumption of symmetric coun-
tries inside a group. Finally, this assumption is dropped and the impact of
heterogeneity is evaluated.
6.3.1 Parameter estimation
Mitigation cost estimation
I use scenario runs from the POLES model6 to generate mitigation cost
curves for different countries. The employed scenario was produced in 2013.
6 Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems model (POLES) is a global simulation
model for the energy sector, developed by Enerdata in collaboration with JRC-IPTS and
University of Grenoble’s CNRS. For a detailed description of the model, see Kitous et al.
(2010) or http://www.enerdata.net/enerdatauk/solutions/energy-models/pol
es-model.php.
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In the baseline, this scenario assumes that dynamic economic growth is re-
stored from 2015 onwards and no global climate agreement is reached, re-
sulting in soaring GHG emissions around the world. From this baseline,
mitigation cost curves are produced by the successive introduction of a car-
bon price.
The POLES scenario runs up to the year 2050. As the largest impacts of
climate change are expected to happen in the very long-term, I use a simple
procedure to extend the emission paths up to 2300, similar to Chapter 3.
Up to 2100, baseline emissions are extrapolated based on the linear trend
of per capita emissions for each country. Population values are taken from
the scenario of medium fertility from the UN World Population Prospects
(United Nations, 2012). For later years, I follow the extension procedure
for RCP8.5 (Meinshausen et al., 2011; IPCC, 2014b). This means constant
emissions up to 2150, followed by linear reduction of global emissions to
the level that is consistent with stable atmospheric concentrations in 2250.
Emissions stay at this level for the rest of the time period.
For each carbon price, I extend the corresponding emission path based on
the linear extension of the relative reduction amount below baseline emis-
sions. The reduction stops when net-zero emissions are reached. Mitigation
costs are calculated as the area under the marginal mitigation cost curve for
each year and country.
Afterwards, emission reductions for each carbon price are accumulated over
the whole time period, 2013 to 2300. Mitigation costs are also aggregated,
using a discount rate as described below. The result is a mitigation cost
curve for each country, with each carbon price providing one data point. I
then estimate the mitigation cost parameter γ as the best fit for a quadratic
function to these data points.
For the symmetric case, all G20 countries are assigned the average emission
reductions and average mitigation costs of G20 countries. Similarly, all non-
G20 countries are assigned the average values of non-G20 countries.
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The discount rate used for the aggregation of mitigation costs is determined
by the Ramsey formula (Arrow et al., 2012). Similar to Chapter 3, the rate of
pure time preference and the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption
are based on the median values from a recent survey of economists (Drupp
et al., 2015). The per capita growth rate of consumption up to a specific year
is approximated using GDP projections from the POLES model. The GDP
projections are extended up to 2300 based on the linear trend of per capita
values, similar to the extension procedure for emissions described above.
For years after 2100, population projections from the UN World Population
to 2300 report are used (United Nations, 2004).
Damage cost estimation
I use the RICE model (Nordhaus, 2010) to estimate the damage cost param-
eter pi for each country. RICE provides cumulative emissions and the cor-
responding temperature increase. It also gives damage functions, depending
on temperature increase, for 12 world regions. For each country and cumu-
lative emission level, I use these functions to calculate damages, as percent
of output. I then compute absolute damages using GDP projections from the
POLES model. These projections are aggregated over time, again using a
discount rate determined by the Ramsey formula. Finally, absolute damages
are given by multiplying the aggregated GDP value with the relative damage
amount calculated from RICE.
After this procedure, I estimate the damage cost parameter pi as the best
fit for a quadratic function to the data points combining cumulative emis-
sions and absolute damages. For the symmetric case, damages are uni-
formly distributed among all countries in a group, analogue to the mitiga-
tion cost estimation.
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6.3.2 Existence of a stable agreement
For the application to the model, I consider 130 countries for which there is
sufficient data available to perform the parameter estimation. However, the
EU is treated as one country and individual EU member states are therefore
removed from the list of countries7. As a result, the group T includes 16
countries (15 non-EU members of the G20, plus the EU). The remaining 87
countries comprise the set R. For the full list of countries, see Table 6.2 for
G20 countries and Table D.1 in Appendix D.2 for non-G20 countries.
Symmetric case
Table 6.1 shows the results of the parameter estimation in the symmetric
case. The large differences in the magnitude of the parameters are a result
of the different number of countries in each group and the fact that most big
emitters are part of the G20.
γ pi Ratio piγ
G20 countries 7,835 148 1.89 E-2
non-G20 countries 149,549 6 4.29 E-5
Table 6.1: Mitigation cost parameter γ and damage cost parameter pi in the symmetric case.
Values of γ and pi in EUR
1015∗(tCO2)2 .
In order to determine if the core of the G20 game is empty or not, the esti-
mated parameters need to be compared to the set of parameters, which lead
to a game with non-empty core, P . Figure 6.4 shows this set for the G20
configuration, n = 103, t = 16. The location of the estimated parameter ra-
tios from Table 6.1 is shown as a red dot.
7 In particular, the United Kingdom is still considered as a member state of the EU and is there-
fore not included as an individual G20 member.
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Figure 6.4:P for n = 103, t = 16 and estimated parameter ratios from Table 6.1.
I find that the estimated parameter ratios lie squarely in P . Specifically,
the ratio of parameters for non-G20 countries is so small that the core of
the game is non-empty, irrespective of the ratio of parameters for G20 coun-
tries (see Proposition 8). In essence, the collective of G20 countries is large
enough, in terms of expected absolute damages from climate change and
ability to reduce emissions, that the behaviour of non-G20 countries does not
change their incentive to cooperate. Therefore, in the highly stylized scenario
of the symmetric case, a stable agreement among G20 countries exists.
Asymmetric case
Table 6.2 shows the results of the parameter estimation for individual G20
countries. The results for non-G20 countries can be found in Table D.1 in
Appendix D.2.
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Country γ pi Ratio piγ
Argentina 50,130 28 5.67E-04
Australia 22,842 25 1.09E-03
Brazil 26,265 48 1.81E-03
Canada 24,296 30 1.24E-03
China 1,083 901 8.32E-01
European Union 10,362 236 2.28E-02
India 1,979 415 2.10E-01
Indonesia 30,187 36 1.18E-03
Japan 33,513 127 3.78E-03
Republic of Korea 70,577 52 7.32E-04
Mexico 75,342 37 4.88E-04
Russian Federation 6,259 34 5.36E-03
Saudi Arabia 69,241 15 2.23E-04
South Africa 48,941 18 3.59E-04
Turkey 26,873 52 1.94E-03
United States 9,034 319 3.54E-02
Table 6.2: Mitigation cost parameter γ and damage cost parameter pi for G20 countries. Values
of γ and pi in EUR
1015∗(tCO2)2 .
The parameter estimation shows a high degree of heterogeneity between G20
countries. China, the EU, India and the US especially stand out among the
group. These countries have the four highest damage cost parameters, re-
sulting from high GDP and, consequently, high absolute damages. They also
have four of the five lowest mitigation cost parameters, resulting from high
emission levels and the accompanying large mitigation opportunities. As a
result, the ratio of damage cost and mitigation cost in these four countries is
one or two orders of magnitude larger than the ratio in other countries.
126
6.4 Conclusion
Consequently, the conclusion about stability of climate cooperation in the
case of asymmetric countries differs considerably from the case of symmet-
ric countries. As Proposition 10 showed, “adding” heterogeneity between
countries can lead to an empty core of the game. The G20 game is such a
case. If the estimated parameters from Table 6.2 are used as the basis of the
game, the core of the game is empty. This result is based solely on the hetero-
geneity of countries. If the ratio of mitigation cost and damage cost param-
eters is increased or decreased by an equal percentage for all G20 countries,
leaving the heterogeneity between countries constant, the core stays empty.
The same is true for a variation of non-G20 parameters. Therefore, I find
that heterogeneity among G20 countries makes a potential climate agree-
ment among the club unstable.
6.4 Conclusion
In order to account for the special structure of climate negotiations in pre-
existing state clubs with fixed membership, I analysed subgames of the co-
operative game by Chander and Tulkens (1997). I find that, contrary to the
model of global negotiations, a stable agreement does not exist for all param-
eter combinations. Instead, existence is determined by the ratio of damage
and mitigation cost parameters. The set of parameters, for which a stable
agreement exists, decreases in size as the extent of the club shrinks, due to
lower gains of cooperation in the club. Additionally, changes in the cost pa-
rameters of both groups (club members and outsiders) lead to vastly different
effects. Parameters of non-cooperative outsiders change the result in a coun-
terintuitive way, as higher damage costs lead to less potential cooperation.
Parameters of club members influence cooperation in a much more intuitive
sense, as higher damages and lower mitigation costs enhance the prospect of
a stable agreement. However, the parameters of the outsiders play a larger
role and can prevent the existence of a stable agreement, when exceeding a
certain upper limit.
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The introduction of asymmetry in the cost parameters of both groups has
a neutral or negative effect on stability of cooperation in the club. While
asymmetry in the parameters of outsider countries does not influence coop-
eration inside the club, asymmetry in the parameters of the club members
hurts the chances of cooperation. This can even lead to a situation in which
the heterogeneity of countries prevents the existence of a stable agreement,
irrespective of all other parameters.
Application of the model to the G20 leads to such a situation: when sym-
metric countries are assumed, the model predicts cooperation in the group.
However, when this assumption is dropped, the core of the subgame is empty
and no stable agreement exists.
Overall, the model is a lot less optimistic about the existence of a stable
agreement in a climate club than in a global negotiation environment. This
was expected as the model mainly considers the impact of potential free-
riding of outsiders on an agreement among club members, making coopera-
tion harder. The negative effects as outlined in this chapter therefore have to
be evaluated against proposed advantages of climate clubs like faster nego-
tiations and better participation from private actors (Biermann et al., 2009),
as well as barriers in global negotiations like the blocking power of small
countries with special circumstances. In addition, the model could be evalu-
ated for different function shapes and other groups of countries. The model
could also be extended in a number of ways. It does not include interna-
tional macroeconomic effects of emission reduction measures in a country
or multiple countries, as were considered in Chapter 3. Also, the model
does not include uncertainty about the values of future mitigation costs or
future damages, as was considered in Chapter 5. These issues are left for
further research.
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Global GHG emissions need to be substantially reduced to avoid danger-
ous climate change. As emission reductions in one country also benefit all
other countries, international cooperation is needed for effective emission
mitigation. This thesis analysed the incentives of countries to cooperate on
emission reductions and the prospect of a global climate agreement.
In particular, the thesis analysed the stability of global climate cooperation
using the concept of core stability. This concept nicely reproduces the re-
quirement of consensus for decisions under the UNFCCC. However, the
standard model is quite abstract and misses several important real-world
properties. This thesis introduced five such properties into the model of in-
ternational climate cooperation based on core stability.
First, consumption of a country was allowed to depend on the emission levels
of all countries, not just emissions of the country itself. A numerical model
was constructed, allowing for the calculation of the emission level and utility
of each country for each possible coalition of countries. The model was
applied using consumption functions from a global CGE model and thus
includes international economic effects of emission reduction measures, for
example technological learning and fossil fuel market effects. Such effects
were missed in previous theoretical and numerical models.
It was found that these effects can indeed make global cooperation unstable,
in contrast to the original model without international economic effects. The
result is driven by fossil fuel exporting regions: in the case of global coop-
eration on climate change, low demand for fossil fuels would decrease its
price and, consequently, the revenue of fossil fuel exporters. While these re-
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gions could be compensated for their agreement to global cooperation, other
regions could also form a coalition of the willing without the fossil fuel ex-
porters. Such a coalition would achieve emission reductions almost as high
as a global coalition, while not having to compensate fossil fuel exporters.
Therefore, no global agreement can satisfy all regions simultaneously, mak-
ing it unstable.
The result arises for two damage scenarios covering the range of damage
estimates by the IPCC. In contrast, in a scenario with damages twice as high
as the upper end of the IPCC range, global cooperation is stable. As high
damages imply high gains from cooperation, the incentive to cooperate is
larger than the negative impacts of fossil fuel market effects in this scenario.
Second, the numerical model was used to identify the impact of different
pathways for the future development of key low-carbon technologies. In
addition to a scenario with mean values for several parameters, two scenar-
ios generated by the CGE model, representing the most optimistic and most
pessimistic parameters values found in the literature, were considered. These
were again combined with three scenarios about climate damages, resulting
in a total of nine scenarios analysed.
It was found that different assumptions about future technology development
can influence the stability of global climate cooperation. Under high dam-
ages and mean or pessimistic technological assumptions, global cooperation
is stable. Under high damages and optimistic assumptions, as well as under
low or medium damages irrespective of technological assumptions, global
cooperation is not stable. More optimistic technology assumptions reduce
the gains of cooperation, due to relatively large unilateral emission reduc-
tions, and thus decrease the stability of global cooperation.
Further, the key drivers of cooperation stability vary by region, depending on
each region’s economic profile. While fossil-fuel exporting regions lose rev-
enue under global cooperation, changes in the energy system can also cause
substantial costs in other regions. The extent of climate damages can also
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cause support or disapproval for global cooperation, if regional damages,
and the associated gains of cooperation, are high or low, respectively.
Third, the original theoretical model was extended to include uncertainty
and its influence on the decision making of countries. A cooperative game
was constructed using concepts from the game-theoretical literature, includ-
ing the application of competing allocation concepts. Distinct models were
constructed for technological uncertainty and for uncertainty about climate
damages. For each combination of uncertainty type and allocation concept,
(non-)emptiness of the core of the game was shown either by an example of
a game with empty core or by a proof of balancedness of the game.
The analysis showed that the incorporation of uncertainty can lead to unsta-
ble global cooperation, if risk is distributed between countries together with
the expected value of a payoff. The result is driven by risk averse countries,
who incur an additional “cost” when having to take on uncertainty. When
the risk preferences of countries differ substantially, this cost can prohibit
global cooperation. However, if the model allows for independent distribu-
tion of risk, the deterministic result of stable global cooperation is reinstated.
In this case, the least risk averse country can act as an insurer by taking on
the risk of other countries for a fee. This creates a global benefit and allows
for a stable global agreement.
The analysis also showed that the results about stability of global coopera-
tion are similar for technological uncertainty and uncertainty in climate dam-
ages. The different types of uncertainty do however influence emission levels
in opposite directions. While technological uncertainty introduces an addi-
tional mitigation cost, the presence of uncertainty in climate damages intro-
duces an additional mitigation benefit. Consequently, global emission levels
are higher under technological uncertainty, and lower under uncertainty in
climate damages, compared to the situation without any uncertainty.
Fourth, a potential alternative to the global UNFCCC process was analysed,
non-global climate clubs. For the analysis, the original global model was
adapted to the situation of climate negotiations in an arbitrary group of coun-
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tries, using the concept of a subgame of a cooperative game. The theoretical
model was first examined under the simplifying assumption of symmetric
countries. It was shown that cooperation can be unstable, in contrast to the
global model, depending on mitigation cost and damage cost parameters.
Furthermore, the assumption of symmetry was dropped and the introduc-
tion of asymmetry in the cost parameters of different countries was shown
to have a neutral or negative effect on stability of cooperation in the club.
While asymmetry in the parameters of countries outside of the club does not
influence cooperation inside the club, asymmetry in the parameters of the
club members hurts the chances of cooperation. This can cause coopera-
tion in the climate club to be unstable, even if it had been stable under the
assumption of symmetric countries.
The application of the climate club model to the G20 showed that such a
situation is not far-fetched. While cooperation is assessed to be stable under
the assumption of symmetric countries, the numerical parameter estimation
for asymmetric countries leads to cooperation being unstable.
The following sections provide overarching conclusions and implications
drawn from the results of this thesis, as well as a critical reflection of the
applied methods and an outlook for further research.
7.1 Conclusions
The thesis shows that the introduction of several real-world properties into
the core stability model of climate cooperation substantially changes the re-
sults. Global climate cooperation is found to be unstable in certain scenarios
after the introduction of international economic effects and of uncertainty.
Climate clubs also do not necessarily offer a way to stable cooperation.
These results show that the core stability model is a useful tool to study im-
portant determinants of the stability of climate cooperation. It can therefore
complement the rich literature on internal and external stability.
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From a more applied point of view, efforts can be made to design the in-
ternational climate negotiations such that the barriers to climate cooperation
featured in this thesis can be overcome.
For example, the evaluation of the impact of international economic effects
shows that special consideration has to be given to large fossil fuel exporting
countries. As fossil fuel revenues often provide a large portion of the state
budget, these countries might expect to be compensated for their loss of fossil
fuel export revenue under a global climate agreement. While other countries
might be reluctant towards the idea of direct monetary compensation, more
indirect measures, such as support for the economic transformation of fossil
fuel exporting countries towards a more sustainable business model, might
be able to attract support.
Further, the analysis of the influence of uncertainty shows that varying risk
preferences between countries can be an obstacle to stable global coopera-
tion. However, it can be overcome by risk redistribution between countries,
which could be facilitated through the Warsaw International Mechanism on
Loss and Damage under the UNFCCC. The uncertainty analysis also high-
lights the positive effects of research on low-carbon technologies, which re-
duces both the cost of mitigation efforts and the uncertainty of mitigation.
Finally, the examination of climate clubs shows that such clubs might not be
an appropriate instrument to overcome barriers to global cooperation. In par-
ticular, groups like the G20 do not seem to offer any advantage, as most of
the competing interests on a global level are still present in the G20. There-
fore, the current support of such groups for the global negotiations under the
UNFCCC seems to justified.
Overall, the thesis shows that several obstacles complicate the path to global
cooperation on GHG emission reductions. However, the thesis only consid-
ered the pure economic inventive of countries. In reality, the perception of
fairness plays a huge role in the climate negotiations. Some factors consid-
ered in this respect are the historical responsibility of developed countries,
the ability to pay for GHG reductions of richer countries, and the capacity
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to reduce emissions of countries with cheap mitigation options. As the dif-
ference between stable and unstable global cooperation is often only a small
fraction of global economic output (see e.g. Chapter 3), the acceptance of
certain fairness principles can help overcome this difference. The structure
of national contributions in the Paris Agreement could manage to bring dif-
ferent perceptions together, as each country can submit what it perceives as
fair. Therefore, this structure might be able to include fairness principles in
a way that helps to make global climate cooperation stable.
7.2 Critical reflection and outlook
The analyses in this thesis introduced several aspects into the model of core
stability and greatly enhanced its level of realism. However, this should just
be seen as an intermediate step, as some limitations remain.
Although numerical models were used to consider a long time period, the de-
cision about emission levels and whether to cooperate in the game-theoretical
models is only made once. However, the international climate negotiations
under the UNFCCC are a dynamic process with decisions made at every
COP. The Paris Agreement stipulates the submission of contributions every
five years, meaning that emission targets are set on a regular basis. Therefore,
an extension to a dynamic game-theoretical framework with negotiations at
each time period, as used by Germain et al. (2003), could further enhance
the realism of the model.
Another remaining limitation is inherent in cooperative game theory and
thereby also in core stability. It is assumed that, once an agreement is
reached, countries will comply with it. Such an agreement might therefore
not be “self-enforcing” in the sense of internal and external stability. Also,
the possibility of renegotiation is ignored. While the unanimity requirement
of negotiations under the UNFCCC somewhat lessens the importance of
these issues, they are by no means irrelevant, as the withdrawal of Canada
from the Kyoto Protocol shows.
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The models used in this thesis also contain a few simplifications in order
to remain solvable in a reasonable amount of time. First, the number of
world regions in the numerical model used in Chapters 3 and 4 is not high
enough for a detailed analysis of countries’ blocking incentives. In partic-
ular, the aggregation of many fossil fuel exporting countries to one region
ignores the substantial difference in projected climate damages between dif-
ferent countries. Therefore, a higher regional resolution of the model would
be highly desirable.
Second, the time horizon of the CGE model is too short for a sensible con-
sideration of climate damages in that period. Therefore, the time period had
to be extended using a rather simple procedure. Preferably, the CGE model
would have covered a time period long enough for an integration of climate
damages, such that no extension procedures would have been needed.
Further, the model does not include a full feedback of the optimization of
emission levels to the consumption side, in the way that integrated assess-
ment models do. If such a feedback were implemented, the impacts of cli-
mate change on the economy, and on certain sectors of the economy, could
be assessed in interaction with the effects of mitigation measures. For ex-
ample, agriculture is one sector likely to be heavily influenced by climate
change (IPCC, 2014a). Consequently, countries in which agriculture ac-
counts for a large share of the economy would be directly affected from
climate change. However, as many agricultural products are internationally
traded, other countries would be affected indirectly. Therefore, the combi-
nation of a CGE model with feedback of climate effects based on emission
levels would enhance the level of realism depicted by the model.
The theoretical models used in Chapters 5 and 6 could also be extended or
modified in a few ways. First, the shape of the consumption and damage
functions could be changed. Some theoretical studies of climate coopera-
tion assume that damages change linearly with emissions (e.g. Breton et al.,
2006; Kolstad and Ulph, 2011; Dellink and Finus, 2012; Nordhaus, 2015).
The specific functions could also be replaced by general functions satisfy-
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ing certain properties. It might still be possible to show some of the simpler
results with these general functions, although the proofs of the main results
might not be replicable with general functions.
In the theoretical model of uncertainty in Chapter 5, other probability dis-
tributions and preference orderings could be used. For example, one might
consider a bounded probability distribution to ensure that emission reduc-
tions reduce consumption and that emissions cause climate damages for all
possible values of the random variable. In that case, the restriction of the
preference ordering to risk averse or risk neutral players could be avoided.
Further, technological uncertainty and uncertainty of climate damages could
be considered in a joint model. This would directly show the opposite im-
pacts of both types of uncertainty on emission levels. However, the stability
of global climate cooperation would likely not be changed, as the established
results for both types of uncertainty are similar.
In addition to the separate analyses of international economic effects, un-
certainty and climate clubs, the properties could also be studied together in
a joint model. While different technological pathways were considered to-
gether with international economic effects in Chapter 4, this did not include
the impact of uncertainty on decision making of countries as in Chapter 5.
A combination of both aspects could identify ways for countries to reduce
or distribute uncertainty in a way that is most beneficial to their economic
structure. Also, the introduction of both aspects in a model of cooperation
in climate clubs could consider specially designed clubs. For example, in-
ternational economic effects could inspire a climate club of the “coalition
of the willing” without fossil fuel exporting countries. Further, a club of
the most risk averse or of the least risk averse countries might be willing to
cooperate under uncertainty.
Finally, several other real-world properties have not yet been considered in
a model of core stability. For example, the ability to adapt to the impacts
of climate change alters the incentives of countries, because an alternative
to emission mitigation that only benefits the executing country is available
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(Benchekroun et al., 2011; Lazkano et al., 2016). Future climate change
might not occur in a predictable pattern, but rather trigger certain tipping
points, leading to irreversible impacts. The existence of such tipping points
can change the incentive structure of the climate cooperation game (Barrett,
2013). The ability of countries to control emissions not just via a cap, but
also via a tax can also change the cooperation incentives (Eichner and Pethig,
2015). In addition, certain mitigation measures exhibit benefits additional to
their emission reductions, and the impact of these additional benefits on the
stability of climate cooperation is ambiguous (Finus and Rübbelke, 2013).
Further, the influence of different forms of financial transfers could be ex-
plored. While the model in this thesis assumes a simple monetary trans-
fer, actual climate finance also occurs in various other forms. Examples
are projects under the UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mechanism or the
Global Environment Facility, bilateral offset mechanisms as pioneered by
Japan, or funds such as the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund.
It would therefore be worthy to explicitly model the finance flows and ex-
plore whether some forms of climate finance are more conducive to stable
climate cooperation than others.
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A Appendix to Chapter 3
Region
Consumption
(NPV)
NAM 1,471.4
EUR 1,110.4
ANZ 69.2
JPN 176.4
EXP 850.8
CHN 845.3
IND 630.1
ROW 2,557.7
Global 7,711.1
Table A.1: NPV of cumulative baseline consumption for each region in trillion 2007 US$.
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Region Allocated amount
NAM 39.90
EUR 33.56
ANZ 0.64
JPN 3.35
EXP 58.99
CHN 27.42
IND 10.97
ROW 278.27
Table A.2: Core-stable payoff vector in the high damages scenario, in utility loss
(NPV, trillion 2007 US$).
Note: the payoff vector was found by manual allocation of the surplus of
the grand coalition, beginning with the “All Singletons” case and adjustment
based on coalitions with an incentive to deviate. It is just one example of
infinitely many core-stable payoff vectors of this game.
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+
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−
θz
(α
i)
)2
θz
(α
i)
≤0
≥
γ
(γ
−
θz
(α
i)
)2
,
(C
.1
0)
151
C Appendix to Chapter 5
w
e
ha
ve
a 1
=
s( ∑ i∈
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≥
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⇒
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C.2 Additional tables
Coalition S V(S)
µ σ2
{1} 8.7498 0.0050
{2} 8.5937 0.0514
{3} 7.6406 1.3917
{4} 7.6406 1.3917
{1,2} 17.4751 0.4565
{1,3} 15.8882 6.9740
{1,4} 15.8882 6.9740
{2,3} 15.8706 6.1752
{2,4} 15.8706 6.1752
{3,4} 15.0455 7.8550
{1,2,3} 25.4051 8.7419
{1,2,4} 25.4051 8.7419
{1,3,4} 24.8395 9.3169
{2,3,4} 25.0362 7.8691
{1,2,3,4} 35.3460 7.0608
Table C.2: Cooperative game with stochastic payoffs resulting from Example 1. Payoffs are
normally distributed withN (µ,σ2).
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Coalition S V(S)
µ σ2
{1} 3.5E+03 3E+05
{2} 4.84E+04 3.11E+07
{3} 4.99E+04 7.783E+08
{1,2} 5.03E+04 1.46E+07
{1,3} 5.38E+04 5.244E+08
{2,3} 9.77E+04 5.340E+08
{1,2,3} 1.009E+05 1.962E+08
Table C.3: Cooperative game with stochastic payoffs resulting from Example 2. Payoffs are
normally distributed withN (µ,σ2).
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=
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+
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+
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=
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.
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=
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=
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Table D.1: Mitigation cost parameter γ and damage cost parameter pi for non-G20 countries.
Values of γ and pi in EUR
1015∗(tCO2)2 .
Country γ pi Ratio piγ
Albania 3,005,055 0.4 1.47E-07
Algeria 137,764 6.5 4.74E-05
Angola 49,048 5.9 1.21E-04
Armenia 1,950,603 0.7 3.67E-07
Azerbaijan 299,633 4.6 1.52E-05
Bahrain 1,483,125 0.7 4.45E-07
Bangladesh 79,901 18.9 2.36E-04
Belarus 114,457 5.2 4.54E-05
Benin 186,505 1.4 7.67E-06
Bolivia 632,482 0.8 1.26E-06
Bosnia and Herzegovina 464,742 0.6 1.21E-06
Botswana 227,080 2.9 1.29E-05
Brunei Darussalam 850,676 1.3 1.49E-06
Cambodia 1,830,733 1.5 8.43E-07
Cameroon 143,023 5.4 3.76E-05
Chile 124,054 7.5 6.03E-05
Colombia 143,750 9.6 6.65E-05
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Congo 278,170 2.9 1.03E-05
Costa Rica 1,653,647 1.5 9.23E-07
Côte d’Ivoire 106,739 5.3 4.92E-05
Croatia 1,432,495 1.1 7.85E-07
Cuba 469,583 2.9 6.25E-06
Democratic Republic of Congo 232,638 3.5 1.52E-05
Dominican Republic 517,231 2.4 4.56E-06
Ecuador 314,463 1.5 4.78E-06
Egypt 28,234 66.3 2.35E-03
El Salvador 1,723,826 1.1 6.39E-07
Eritrea 1,702,809 0.3 1.98E-07
Ethiopia 168,895 8.2 4.85E-05
Gabon 381,259 2.7 7.11E-06
Georgia 1,114,272 1.1 1.02E-06
Ghana 86,581 3.7 4.25E-05
Guatemala 1,103,412 1.8 1.59E-06
Haiti 4,539,976 0.2 4.93E-08
Honduras 1,377,647 0.7 4.88E-07
Iceland 7,033,125 0.2 2.49E-08
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 50,191 29.6 5.90E-04
Iraq 1,193,223 1.2 9.97E-07
Israel 126,570 15.9 1.26E-04
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Jordan 521,852 1.4 2.75E-06
Kazakhstan 28,124 8.0 2.85E-04
Kenya 65,134 7.7 1.19E-04
Kuwait 689,106 3.1 4.45E-06
Kyrgyzstan 1,081,827 0.5 4.29E-07
Lebanon 645,246 2.4 3.79E-06
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 439,760 10.8 2.46E-05
Macedonia 1,227,376 0.3 2.72E-07
(the former Yugoslavian Republic of)
Malaysia 38,895 24.3 6.26E-04
Moldova (Republic of) 1,094,593 0.5 4.28E-07
Mongolia 518,939 0.4 6.90E-07
Morocco 129,194 12.8 9.90E-05
Mozambique 240,725 4.0 1.65E-05
Namibia 341,143 2.4 6.99E-06
Nepal 1,044,121 2.0 1.92E-06
New Zealand 286,904 2.8 9.70E-06
Nicaragua 2,318,621 0.5 2.05E-07
Nigeria 11,476 41.1 3.58E-03
Norway 298,449 3.2 1.09E-05
Oman 628,547 1.8 2.87E-06
Pakistan 32,047 27.7 8.64E-04
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Panama 988,384 1.3 1.36E-06
Paraguay 1,962,853 0.7 3.61E-07
Peru 234,885 5.8 2.47E-05
Philippines 92,187 21.7 2.35E-04
Qatar 610,857 2.2 3.55E-06
Senegal 125,930 3.1 2.50E-05
Singapore 126,212 17.2 1.37E-04
Sri Lanka 257,471 5.4 2.09E-05
Sudan 56,201 10.3 1.83E-04
Switzerland 496,576 4.7 9.53E-06
Syrian Arab Republic 214,914 2.8 1.32E-05
Tajikistan 2,448,286 0.4 1.75E-07
Tanzania (United Republic of) 101,043 9.4 9.32E-05
Thailand 38,497 31.7 8.23E-04
Togo 588,063 0.7 1.23E-06
Trinidad and Tobago 269,998 0.9 3.18E-06
Tunisia 331,179 6.4 1.94E-05
Turkmenistan 139,271 1.4 9.90E-06
Ukraine 24,124 6.5 2.70E-04
United Arab Emirates 311,136 6.3 2.02E-05
Uruguay 1,192,344 2.0 1.69E-06
Uzbekistan 79,010 5.7 7.23E-05
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Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 62,088 10.1 1.63E-04
Vietnam 63,874 10.4 1.63E-04
Yemen 2,461,837 1.1 4.53E-07
Zambia 226,632 3.0 1.33E-05
Zimbabwe 106,028 1.5 1.37E-05
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